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THE LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR A PEOPLE-BASED APPROACH TO THE
CONTROL OF MINERAL RESOURCES IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE
CONGO
Dunia P. Zongwe*
ABSTRACT
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is endowed with vast mineral wealth. However, although
renewed activities in the mining sector ameliorated the DRC’s fiscal position and GDP growth in 2005-07,
generally the peoples of the DRC neither participate in nor benefit from the exploitation of mineral
resources. The problem is that the exploitation of mineral resources in the DRC go against the interests of
the Congolese peoples. To be sure, the Congolese peoples are some of the poorest in the world. The
main purpose of this paper is to explore the ways in which the peoples of the DRC can in domestic,
regional and international law gain control over mineral resources. Accordingly, the basic question for this
paper is: What legal justifications in national, regional and international law could serve to increase the
control of the peoples over mineral resources in the DRC? The paper argues that the scholarship on the
legal justifications for a people-based mineral control do not fully articulate the right to control mineral
resources (RCMR). The existing scholarship on the RCMR is limited in that it fails to: (1) fully articulate
the RCMR, (2) examine the RCMR in terms of first and second generations of human rights and in terms
of national mineral resources law, and (3) address the RCMR in the particular circumstances of the DRC.
This paper fills up these gaps in the scholarship on the RCMR. Firstly, the paper demonstrates that, in
Congolese law, regional and international law, there is more than one principal justification for a peoplebased control of mineral resources. These justifications include popular sovereignty, socio-economic
rights, the right of peoples to enjoy their national wealth, economic self-determination, permanent
sovereignty over natural resources, and the right to development. Secondly, the paper utilizes democratic
and socio-economic rights enshrined in the Congolese Constitution and the Mining Code as a point of
departure in advocating a people-based control of mineral resources. Finally, the paper gives an overview
of the exploitation of mineral resources in the particular circumstances of the DRC.
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The tragedy of the many tragedies in the Congo was that the people woke up after years of war and
found that the family wealth had been given away, or sold off, or at least as far as people knew, it seemed
to have just flitted away.
Prof. Peter Rosenblum, Carter Center and consultant to the Congolese commission for the review of
mining contracts.

1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Rationale
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is one of the world’s wealthiest countries
in terms of natural resources, for which reason it is sometimes called a ‘geological
scandal’.
1

It is endowed with vast mineral wealth. It produces cobalt, coltan (used in turn to

produce niobium and tantalum),2 copper, petroleum, industrial and gem diamonds, gold,
silver, zinc, manganese, tin, uranium, coal, and timber. Mineral resources are exploited
by the Congolese government, local and foreign investors,3 artisanal miners, and, in
eastern Congo, by armed groups.4
Although renewed mining activities, the source of most exports and foreign
exchange earnings, ameliorated DRC’s fiscal position and GDP growth in 2005-07,5
generally the peoples of the DRC neither participate in nor benefit from the exploitation
of mineral resources. The problem is that the exploitation and management of mineral

1

FATAL TRANSACTIONS, THE STATE VS. THE PEOPLE: GOVERNANCE, MINING AND THE TRANSITIONAL 6
(Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa 2006).
2
Coltan is used in consumer electronics products like cell phones, televisions, DVDs, digital cameras,
and computers.
3
Foreign investors include De Beers Centenary A.G., BHP Billiton World Exploration Inc., and AngloGold Kilo.
4
Some neighboring countries have also been involved in the illegal exploitation of mineral resources in
the DRC, namely Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. See Mahmoud Kassem, Rapport du Groupe d’Experts
sur l’Exploitation Illégale des Ressources Naturelles et Autres Richesses de la République Démocratique
du Congo, delivered to the Security Council, U.N.Doc. S/2003/1027, (Oct. 23, 2003)[hereinafter UN
Report on DRC Resources]; Democratic Republic of Congo v. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda (2004)
AHRLR 19 (ACHPR 2003) ¶ 92ff.
5
Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Congo, Democratic Republic of the (2008),
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.htm.
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resources in the DRC go against the interests of the Congolese peoples, mainly due to
corruption6, lack of institutional capacity,7 and the failure to enforce the law.8
The Congolese peoples are some of the world’s poorest: The DRC ranks 168th
out of 174 countries in terms of human development and 88th out of 108 countries in
terms of human poverty;9 poverty and unemployment are widespread; three-quarters of
the population are under-nourished;10 approximately 5 million people died as an indirect
consequence of the 1996-1997 and 1998-2003 civil wars11 fuelled by, amongst others,
the exploitation of mineral resources.12 The African Development Bank reported that
social indicators in the DRC are so low that it will be virtually impossible for the DRC to
reach even one of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015.13
1.2. Research objective and questions
The main purpose of this paper is to explore the ways in which the peoples of the DRC
can in domestic and international law participate in and benefit from the exploitation of
mineral resources. Stated differently, the purpose of the paper is to survey municipal,
regional and international law in order to identify principles and rules that entitle peoples
6

th

The DRC ranks 168 out of 179 in terms of corruption: Transparency International, Corruption
Perception Index, http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007 (last visited
March 14, 2008).
7
th
The DRC ranks 7 out of 32 failed states: See The Fund for Peace, Failed States Index Scores 2007,
http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=229&Itemid=366
(last
visited April 7, 2008).
8
GLOBAL W ITNESS, DIGGING IN CORRUPTION: FRAUD, ABUSE AND EXPLOITATION IN KATANGA’S COPPER AND
COBALT MINES 41 (Global Witness Publishing Inc. 2006)[hereinafter GLOBAL W ITNESS, CORRUPTION];
MUZONG W. KODI, ANTI-CORRUPTION CHALLENGES IN POST-ELECTIONS DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 15
(Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2007)(stating that the Congolese corrupt elites have plundered
mineral resources in collusion with international networks).
9
United Nations Development Programme, 2007/2008 Human Development Index Rankings (2008),
http://www.undp.org.
10
See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT (United Nations
Development Programme 2005).
11
See INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE, MORTALITY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: AN
ONGOING CRISIS (International Rescue Committee 2007).
12
Julie L. Fishman, Is Diamond Smuggling Forever? The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: The
First Step Down the Long Road to Solving the Blood Diamond Trade Problem, 13 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV.
217, 220ff (2005); André Mbata B. Mangu, The Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the
Protection of Rights under the African Charter, 3 AHRLJ 243 (2003). Armed Activities on the Territory of
the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda)(Order of Dec. 19, 2005), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/116/10455.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2008) shows how the plundering of
natural resources can help sustain a war and the violation of human rights.
13
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, AFRICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: MEASURING THE PULSE OF AFRICA 2007 212
(African Development Bank and OECD Development Centre 2007).
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to control mineral resources in the DRC. The ultimate goal is to enable peoples to utilize
both advocacy and litigation to prosecute the claim that they are entitled to participate in
and benefit from the exploitation of mineral resources.
Accordingly, the basic research question for this paper is: What legal
justifications in national, regional and international law could serve to increase the
control of the peoples over mineral resources in the DRC? From the basic research
question, two critical sub-issues flow: The first issue is ‘what is the current state of the
exploitation and management of mineral resources in the DRC?’ and the second issue
is ‘how can the peoples be given greater participation in and benefit of the exploitation
of mineral resources?’.

1.3. Literature review
The existing body of scholarship on the peoples’ right to control mineral resources
(RCMR) focuses on: conceptual analyses of the legal justifications for the control of
mineral resources by the people, the RCMR as a third generation human right or
solidarity right, and the RCMR in oil-producing and resource-rich countries like Nigeria,
Equatorial Guinea and Angola.
This body of scholarship shows that there are several arguments in law, whether
municipal or international, for peoples to press for the RCMR. In municipal law, peoples
can argue for the control of mineral resources on the basis of the right to enjoy national
wealth;14 the right to popular sovereignty;15 certain democratic rights like equality,16 nondiscrimination17 and the right to receive information;18 socio-economic rights;19 and the
provisions of the 2002 Mining Code.20

14

CONSTITUTION DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO [hereinafter Constitution] art. 58.
Constitution art. 9.
16
Constitution arts. 11 and 12.
17
Constitution arts. 13 and 14.
18
GLOBAL W ITNESS, UNDER-MINING PEACE: TIN: THE EXPLOSIVE TRADE IN CASSITERITE IN EASTERN DRC 5
(Global Witness 2005)[hereinafter GLOBAL W ITNESS, TIN].
19
Constitution Title II, Chapter 2.
20
CODE MINIER [C. MIN.]. This paper uses the official English translation of the Mining Code.

15
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In international law, one argument for the control of mineral resources is
economic self-determination.21 The right to economic self-determination refers to the
capacity of peoples to dispose freely of mineral resources according to their
democratically-taken decisions.22 Another relevant argument for the greater control of
mineral resources is the principle of sovereignty over natural resources.23 Sovereignty
over natural resources entails a number of associated rights, all of which can found a
claim by the peoples for the control of mineral resources.24 However, the problem with
the literature on all these arguments is that it does not address the logical implications
of holding that peoples, and not the state, are entitled to control resources.25 Recently,
however, there have been a few analyses of the implications of holding that peoples are
entitled to control mineral resources in Africa.26 The controversial right to development
is a third ground for a claim by the peoples for the control of mineral resources.27 One
problem with the right to development is the difficulty in identifying the right-bearers and
the duty-holders.28

21

Alice Farmer, Towards a Meaningful Rebirth of Economic Self-determination: Human Rights
Realisation in Resource-Rich Countries, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 417 (2006); Richard N. Kiwanuka,
The Meaning of ‘People’ in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 82 AM. J. INT’L. L. 80, 95
(1988).
22
Alice Farmer, supra note 21, at 418.
23
NICO SCHRIJVER, SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES: BALANCING RIGHTS AND DUTIES 258ff
(Cambridge University Press 1997); PHILIP SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 236
(Cambridge University Press 2003).
24
Solomon A. Dersso, The Jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights with
Respect to Peoples’ Rights, 6 AHRLJ 358, 365 (2006); Social and Economic Rights Centre Action Centre
(SERAC) and Another v. Nigeria (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001)[hereinafter SERAC] ¶ 58.
25
J. Oloka-Onyango, Reinforcing Marginalized Rights in an Age of Globalisation: International
Mechanisms, Non-state Actors, and the Struggle for Peoples’ Rights in Africa. 18 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV.
851, 891 (2003)[hereinafter Oloka-Onyango, Peoples’ Rights]; GHEORGHE ELIAN, THE PRINCIPLE OF
SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES 215 (Alphen 1979).
26
Emeka Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty and Peoples’ Ownership of Natural Resources in
International Law, 38 GEO. W ASH. INT’L. L. REV. 33 (2006); Alice Farmer, supra note 21; Ian Gary,
Transparency and Accountability in the Use of Petroleum Revenues: A Fundamental Ingredient for
Security, Reconstruction, and Reconciliation in Africa’s Booming Petro-states, in SECURITY,
RECONSTRUCTION, AND RECONCILIATION: W HEN THE W ARS END 38, 39 (Muna Ndulo ed., 2007).
27
G.A. Res. 55/56, U.N. Doc. (Jan. 29, 2001), preamble (stating that diamonds play an important role in
fuelling conflict and that the link between the illicit transaction of rough diamonds and armed conflict must
be broken as a contribution to prevention and settlement of conflicts); see ISSA G. SHIVJI, THE CONCEPT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 29-33 (Codesria Book Series 1989); JOHN DUGARD, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SOUTH
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 326-327 (Juta and Company Ltd 2005); Constitution art. 58.
28
Isabella D. Bunn, The Right to Development: Implications for International Economic Law, 15 AM. U.
INT’L. L. REV. 1425 (2000).
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The existing scholarship is limited in that it fails to: (1) articulate the right of
peoples to control resources; (2) examine the right to control mineral resources in terms
of first and second generation of human rights and in terms of national mineral
resources legislation; and (3) address the right to control mineral resources in the
particular case of the DRC.
In view thereof, this paper explores the legal justifications for a people-based
control of mineral resources in the DRC and then articulates the RCMR within a
comprehensive human rights framework.
1.4. Thesis statement and underlying premises
The paramount argument of the paper is that, although scholars have advanced several
legal justifications for the control of mineral resources, they fail to fully articulate the right
to control mineral resources (RCMR). There are three reasons for the main argument.
The primary reason for the main argument is that the scholars who discussed the legal
justifications for the control of mineral resources by the people all assumed that there is
one legal justification for such control. This paper demonstrates that in actual fact there
is more than one legal justification for a people-based control of mineral resources.29
Secondly, scholars have a propensity to search international law for one justification to
argue that the people must control mineral resources. By contrast, this paper surveys
municipal law for justifications for the control of mineral resources by the peoples.
Finally, scholars have engaged in conceptual analyses of the legal justifications for the
popular control of mineral resources without stating the policy implications of these
justifications. Even when scholars do discuss the implications of mineral control of the
people, it is nonetheless the implications of the control, and not the right to control, that
form the basis of their discussion.

1.5. Definition of terms and concepts
A key phrase of the paper is ‘control of mineral resources’. Although ‘control’ means
different things in different contexts, this paper defines ‘control’ in terms of process and
29

Chapter 4.
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outcome. First, in terms of process, ‘control’ means participating in decision-making. In
terms of outcome, on the other hand, ‘control’ means benefiting from the proceeds of a
given activity. 30 Thus, the argument that the peoples of the DRC must control mineral
resources means that they must participate in decisions concerning these resources
and that they must benefit materially from mining activities.31
The right to control mineral resources (RCMR), on the other hand, is the legal
entitlement of peoples to participate in and benefit from the exploitation of mineral
exploitation. There is a fundamental difference between the control of mineral resources
and the RCMR. Whereas the definition of the control of mineral resource is factual and
descriptive, the definition of the RCMR is legal and prescriptive. This distinction is
crucial to the main argument of this paper.32
Another term frequently used in this paper is ‘people’. ‘People’ is a term which
has several meanings. In the African context, an authoritative interpretation of the
African Charter showed that ‘people’ may at the very least refer to four concepts.33 First,
‘people’ may refer to the African peoples who lived under colonial rule.34 Second, it may
also refer to the entire population of a country.35 However, for the purposes of the
paper, the singular form of ‘people’ refers to individuals in general.
The paper adopts the plural form ‘peoples’ to refer to the entire population of the
DRC. It uses the plural form to refer to every level and every dimension of the
Congolese identity at and from which individuals decide to organize politically.36 Thus,

30

Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 21(5), June 27, 1981,
21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) [hereinafter African Charter] (providing that the peoples should be able to ‘fully benefit
from the advantages derived from their national resources’); Alice Farmer, supra note 21, at 437 (stating
that economic self-determination requires that all peoples must be able to freely dispose of their natural
resources and that such free disposition in turn requires a certain level of political participation in a
representative body that distributes the natural wealth).
31
Monika Weber-Fahr et al., Mining, in A SOURCEBOOK FOR POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGIES 439-468,
440ff (Jeni Klugman ed., 2002) (stating that mining can benefit the peoples both directly by generating
income and creating opportunities and indirectly); Lila Barrera-Hernandez, Sovereignty over Natural
Resources under Examination: The Inter-American Human Rights System and Natural Resource
Allocation, 12 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 43 (2006)(concluding that participation ensures the enjoyment
of natural resources).
32
See Chapter 4.
33
Richard N. Kiwanuka, supra note 21.
34
Id. at 88ff.
35
Id.at 95ff.
36
I am grateful to Prof. Staffan Lindberg for helping me formulate this definition of ‘people’.
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peoples refer to, depending on the context, the various ethnic groups, provincial groups,
investors, women or children, trade unions, political parties, and so forth.37
Third, ‘people’ may refer to a minority in the country, like the Batwa in the DRC.38
The fourth meaning of ‘people’ may refer to the state. In this paper, we submit that
equating the state to the peoples undermines the RCMR because such equation does
not reflect the political reality in the DRC.39
Finally, the paper uses the phrases ‘mineral resources’ and ‘natural resources’
interchangeably. Actually, the two phrases are different in that the latter is more general
than and includes the former. However, the paper uses them interchangeably because
the principles and rules of law applicable to natural resources by and large apply to
mineral resources as well. Mineral resources are but a sub-category of natural
resources.

1.6. Chapter overview
The body of this paper consists of four parts. Chapter 2 links the disposal of mineral
resources and human rights to show that the disposal of mineral resources is a human
rights issue. Chapter 3 explicates, using the Katanga and Kivu provinces as case
studies, the disposal of mineral resources in the DRC. Chapter 4 explores the possible
legal arguments for the proposition that the peoples of the DRC have the inalienable
right to control mineral resources (RCMR). This chapter also articulates the RCMR by
arguing that the RCMR is a right independent of the legal arguments that justify it.
Finally, Chapter 5 sketches the policy implications of the argument that peoples are
entitled to control mineral resources. The final chapter underlines that the crucial policy
implication of the RCMR is state building.

37

Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire (2000) AHRLR 72 (ACHPR 1995) ¶ 3 (holding that whether the
Katangese is an ethnic group is immaterial and preferring to focus on the claims made by the ‘group’
instead). It is submitted that, like the Katangese Peoples’ Congress decision, it is more pragmatic to allow
for an elastic and flexible definition of people and to concentrate more on the claims made by the people
in question.
38
Richard N. Kiwanuka, supra note 21. at 99ff.
39
Id. at 91ff.
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2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MINERAL RESOURCES AND HUMAN RIGHTS
This chapter demonstrates the relationship between mineral resources and human
rights. It demonstrates that this relationship is evident in both the provisions and
violations of human rights law. It also argues that a human rights approach to mining is
a most appropriate strategy to infuse concerns for a people-based control of mineral
resources into mining legislation and practices.
2.1. Mineral resources in the violations of human rights law
The relationship between mineral resources and human rights law is manifest in the
violations of human rights law. Many a scholar posited that human wrongs are the
source of human rights.40 Similarly, the present paper is structured around the basic
idea that the history of human rights violations in the DRC should inform and
substantiate human rights provisions.
The mineral resources and human rights relationship is manifest mostly during massive
violations of human rights, especially during armed conflicts. The poor management of a
large mining sector almost unavoidably results in massive violations of human rights
and breeds armed conflicts. The substantial mining revenues often create cycles of
corruption and inefficient governance, which both set the scene for the massive
violations of human rights and armed conflicts.41 The fact that DRC’s 1996-2003 civil
wars claimed the life of over 5 million people, the worst humanitarian crisis since World
War II, is the most irrefutable evidence of the connection between mining and human
rights.42

40

Christof H. Heyns, A ‘Struggle Approach’ to Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS, PEACE AND JUSTICE IN
AFRICA: A READER 15-35 (Christof H. Heyns & Karen Stefiszyn eds., 2006)(arguing that it is easier to
identify injustice than justice and to work out a way through from human wrongs to human rights); Jerome
J. Shestack, The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 210 (1998) (explaining
that injustice is one of the philosophical foundations of human rights); Robert Alexy, A Defence of
Radbruch’s Formula, in RECRAFTING THE RULE OF LAW; THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ORDER (David Dyzenhaus ed.,
Hart Publishing 1999)(arguing that law loses its legal validity when its contradiction with justice reaches
an ‘intolerable level’); EDMOND N. CAHN, A SENSE OF INJUSTICE (New York University Press 1949) (arguing
that demands for equality, dignity and fair adjudication are rooted in a sense of injustice).
41
See Monika Weber-Fahr et al., supra note 31, at 443.
42
See INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE, supra note 11.
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Several stakeholders and actors on both the local and international scene have
recognized that the exploitation of mineral resources can have a deleterious impact on
the protection of human rights.43 Most significantly, the UN has on many occasions
singled out mineral resources as a cause of conflicts in Africa.44 The UN General
Assembly passed a resolution in which it urges the diamond-rich countries and the
diamond industry to ‘find ways to break the link between conflict diamonds and armed
conflict.’45
More specifically, the UN has published a number of documents to address the human
rights violations caused by the illegal exploitation of mineral resources in the DRC.
There are two reports that abidingly illustrate the negative relationship between mineral
resources and human rights in the DRC. The first report is by the UN Secretary-General
and the second by a panel of experts on the illegal exploitation of natural resources and
other forms of wealth in the DRC [UN Report on DRC Resources].46 The UN Report on
DRC Resources is particularly significant. To start with, the Report states that there is a
geographical correlation between the activities of armed groups and natural resources
exploitation in the DRC.47 Moreover, the Report acknowledges the link between the
illegal exploitation of natural resources, the illicit trade of those resources and the
proliferation and trafficking of arms as key factors in fuelling and exacerbating the
conflicts in the Great Lakes.48
The issue of the illegal exploitation of mineral resources in the DRC was also the object
of two cases brought by the DRC government against Uganda and Rwanda before the
International Court of Justice,49 and one communication before the African Commission
on Human and Peoples’ Rights.50
43

For instance, the actor Leonardo DiCaprio in the movie Blood Diamond brought to public attention the
central role of diamonds, and mineral resources generally, in causing armed conflicts.
44
KOFI ANNAN, The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable
Development in Africa, ¶ 14ff, Report of the Secretary-General, delivered to the Security Council and the
General Assembly, U.N.Doc. S/1998/318, A/52/871 (April 13, 1998).
45
G.A. Res. 55/56, U.N. Doc. (Jan. 29, 2001), supra note 27 ¶ 2.
46
The Secretary-General, Report on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/1098 (Nov. 17, 2003); and the UN
Report on DRC Resources, supra note 4, respectively.
47
Supra note 27, ¶ 46.
48
Id. ¶ 43-47.
49
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), supra
note 12; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda)
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The bottom line of this relationship between mining and human rights is the

2.2. Mineral resources in the provisions of human rights law
The relationship between mineral resources and human rights law is evident not only in
the violations but also in the several provisions of several human rights instruments,
domestic, regional and international.
2.2.1. Municipal law
First of all, the Congolese Constitution contains a number of provisions linking mineral
resources and human rights. The Constitution establishes permanent sovereignty over
natural resources;51 provides for the right to enjoy natural wealth and resources;52
empowers the state to distribute that wealth and to guarantee the right to
development;53 and criminalizes any conduct depriving the Congolese peoples of the
enjoyment of these wealth and resources.54 Except for the one on the permanent
sovereignty over natural resources, all these provisions are found in the bill of rights of
the Constitution.55
The Congolese Mining Code, although not a human rights instrument, also contains
provisions which aim at realizing the socio-economic rights of the Congolese peoples.
For instance, the Code requires that applicants for exploitation licenses attach to their
application a plan as to how the exploitation of the mine applied for will contribute to the
development of the surrounding communities.56

(Order of Feb. 3, 2006), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/126/10435.pdf (last visited Feb. 29,
2008); see Faustin Z. Ntoubandi, The Congo/Uganda case: A Comment on the Main Legal Issues, 7
AHRLJ 162, 163ff (2007).
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2.2.2. International law
Like civil law countries in general, the DRC is monist, which implies that the
international treaties ratified by the DRC are part of the national legal system and are
superior to Congolese laws. Article 215 of the Constitution provides that international
treaties duly ratified by the DRC have higher authority than the laws of the DRC.57 This
provision means that the human rights treaties that the DRC ratified and that address
the issue of mineral resources not only bind the DRC, they are also superior to the laws
of the DRC.
The DRC has ratified the major human rights treaties, including the international bill of
rights. Article 1(2) of both the CCPR and the CESCR lay down that ‘[a]ll peoples may,
for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources.58’ The African
Charter in its article 21(1) contains provisions similar to article 1(2) of both the CCPR
and the CESCR.59
Other international treaties specifically and expressly provide for the right to enjoy or
exploit mineral resources. These treaties include the 1982 Convention on the Law of the
Sea;60 the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States;61 the 1992
Framework Convention on Climate Change;62 the 1992 Convention on Biological
Diversity;63 the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of
Treaties;64 and the 1983 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of
State Property, Archives and Debt.65

57

See Constitution preamble.
United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. [hereinafter
CCPR]; United Nations Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993, U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter CESCR].
59
African Charter.
60
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 56 and 93, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
The DRC ratified this treaty on 17 February 1989.
61
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res 3281 (XXIX), art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/3281 (May
1, 1974).
62
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107. The DRC
ratified this treaty on 9 January 1995.
63
United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 143. The DRC ratified
this treaty on 3 December 1994.
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United Nations Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties art. 13, Aug. 22,
1978, 17 I.L.M. 1488.
65
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Debt art. 38(2), April 8, 1983, 25 I.L.M. 1640.
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In addition, there are myriad resolutions of the UN General Assembly which also
proclaim the right to enjoy or exploit mineral resources. These resolutions address
various issues, including natural resources,66 the right to exploit freely natural wealth
and resources,67 and state sovereignty over natural resources and all economic
activities.68
2.3. A human rights approach to the control of mineral resources
In a fundamental sense, a human rights approach conceptualizes and formulates the
issue of control of mineral resources in terms of human rights. In 2005, the Congolese
constituent assembly endorsed the human approach to the control of mineral resources
by couching the right of the peoples to enjoy national wealth in human rights terms in
the bill of rights.69
Scholars have not always accepted human rights approaches uncritically, and critical
scholars would be rightly entitled to challenge the wisdom of a human rights approach
to resolve problems in mining law. While there may be as many criticisms of human
rights as scholars, the following criticisms, when applied to mineral resources, are
sufficiently representative.70
One criticism is that human rights have so dominated the imagination of policy makers
and implementers that more valuable strategies to emancipate people are less
available.71 This criticism is a half-truth. Even if policy makers allocate most resources
to human rights, the fact remains that alternative approaches are still available, albeit to
a lesser extent. Further, in the context of the DRC, a human rights approach to the
control of mineral resources is a constitutional requirement.72 In any event, a human
rights approach does not entail the exclusion of other strategies for the alleviation of
human suffering.
66

G.A. Res. 523 (VI), U.N. Doc. A/2119 (Jan 12, 1952).
G.A. Res. 626 (VII), U.N. Doc. A/2361 (Dec. 21, 1952).
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Declaration on the Establishment of a New Economic Order, § 4(e), G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. Doc.
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Constitution art. 58.
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Another argument relates to the ‘double-edged nature’ of the rights discourse.73 The
argument is that, while the discourse mobilizes people, it also freezes structures of
inequality and preserves the social and economic status quo by entrenching certain
property rights.74 Although the double-edge effect of human rights is an essential and
inevitable part of the rights discourse, the real problem is practical: It is the manner in
which the state implements human rights. In the previous constitutional dispensation in
the DRC, the inflexible property rights regime of mining concessions undermined human
rights and adversely impacted on state revenues.75 By contrast, the property rights
regime of the new Mining Code has worked out a more supple property rights regime
that catalyzes the realization of human rights.
A third criticism is that human rights criticizes the state and seeks public law remedies
while delegitimizing remedies in the domain of private law and non-state actors.76 This
criticism is not entirely true because human rights oblige states to protect peoples from
violations of their rights by private parties and non-state actors.77 Human rights law
obliges the DRC government to provide rights of action and effective remedies in order
to protect right-holders from violations of their right to control mineral resources by third
parties. Right-holders can use these rights of action and remedies against third parties.
Finally, some scholars argue that, notwithstanding claims that they are universal,
human rights are actually the product of Western culture and history.78 There is some
substance in this criticism. However, the need to use a human rights approach to the
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MAKAU MUTUA, HUMAN RIGHTS: A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CRITIQUE 128 (University of Pennsylvania
Press 2002).
74
Id.
75
Exposé des Motifs du Code Minier, JOURNAL OFFICIEL, special edition, (2002)(DRC)[hereinafter
Exposé].
76
David Kennedy, supra note 70, at 109.
77
SERAC ¶ 44; Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertés v. Chad (2000) AHRLR 66
(ACHPR 1995) ¶ 20.
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Heiner Bielefeldt, Muslim Voices in the Human Rights Debate, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 587
(1995)(understanding human rights to be relative and advocating the harmonization of Shari’a norms and
human rights); Abdullahi An-Na’im, Cultural Transformation and the Normative Consensus on the Best
Interests of the Child, 8 INT’L. J. LAW POLICY FAMILY 62-81 (1994)(arguing that cross-cultural dialogues can
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Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 400 (1984)(arguing that
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control of mineral resources in the DRC does not reflect Western culture or history. It is
rather the tragic history and traumatic experiences of millions of Congolese, and
encoded in their genetic memory, that prompt a human rights approach to mining law.
The added value of a human rights approach lies in the fact that, unlike more traditional
approaches to mining, the human rights approach has the effect of mainstreaming
human concerns into mining legislation and practices.
The following chapter shows that, whilst mining is inextricably connected to human
rights, the state has thus far failed to make the connection between the two, with
negative consequences for the peoples.
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3. THE EXPLOITATION OF MINERAL RESOURCES IN THE DRC
The previous chapter established the connection between mineral resources and
human rights. This chapter proceeds to demonstrate that Congolese peoples do not,
and never did, control mineral resources. Earlier, we defined ‘control’ in terms of
participation and benefit.79 Accordingly, this chapter shows that the Congolese peoples
do not control mineral resources in that they neither participate in nor benefit from the
exploitation of these resources. The chapter first provides a historical background, it
explains the salient features of the Mining Code, and then uses the two Kivu and the
Katanga provinces to briefly illustrate the point that Congolese peoples do not control
mineral resources. Where several scholars focused on international law to advocate a
people-based control of mineral resources,80 this chapter adds an analysis of national
mineral resources legislation.
3.1. Historical background
3.1.1. Politics
From King Leopold II to President Joseph Kabila, the history of the DRC is chequered,
immersed in several bloodbaths,81 and is one in which the state constantly had to define
and redefine itself. It is a vicious circle of poverty, conflict, and change of government.
Throughout this history, DRC’s mineral wealth has been the unfortunate cause of
conflicts and instability rather than prosperity and development.
One can distinguish three periods in DRC’s history as a state. The first period, from the
Berlin Conference in 1884 to 1908, refers to the status of Congo as a ‘free’ state,
officially called the Free State of Congo.82 Even though Congo was officially created in
1884 as a ‘free’ state, in actual fact, the then Congo was the sole private property of the
79
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Alice Farmer, supra note 21; Emeka Duruigbo, supra note 26; Robert Dufresne, The Opacity of Oil: Oil
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81
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Belgian king, Leopold II. The second period, from 1908 to Independence in 1960, refers
to Congo as a colonial territory. In 1908, pursuant to king Leopold II’s will, Belgium
annexed Congo as a colonial territory. One major contribution of Belgian rule was the
creation and development of the industrial exploitation of copper in Katanga, which was
in the early years of Congo’s Independence the principal pillar of the economy. The third
period, from Independence on 30 June 1960 up to date, refers to Congo as an
independent state in the sense of it being run by the Congolese peoples.
Tragically, Independence has never translated in many political, social, and economic
gains for the Congolese peoples. On the contrary, since Independence, conflicts and
strife,83 involving both local and foreign actors, 84 have always shaken Congo. Mobutu
Sese Seko, who became president in 24 November 1965 through a coup and later a
key player during the Cold War in Central Africa, proved a brutal and ruthless dictator
until his ousting in 1997. Mobutu did not hesitate to use the country’s mineral wealth for
local and foreign patronage, which eventually resulted in the institutionalization of
corruption at every echelon of government up to this day.85
In August 1996, a civil war erupted. Laurent Désiré Kabila toppled Mobutu with an
insurrection backed by Rwanda and Uganda. Kabila served as the country’s president
from 1997 to 2001. Subsequently, President Laurent Désiré Kabila was himself
challenged in August 1998 by another insurrection backed by Rwanda and Uganda.
One of his bodyguards assassinated Laurent Kabila on 16 January 2001. His son,
Joseph Kabila, was nominated head of state. In December 2002, all warring parties
signed a peace accord in Pretoria to end the fighting. The warring parties set up a
transitional government in July 2003; with Joseph Kabila as president and joined by four
vice presidents representing the former belligerents. During the wars, the government
83
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entered into several poorly negotiated mining contracts with private partners that
allowed excessive repatriation of profits abroad86 and that contributed little or nothing to
the national treasury and the peoples.87 The transitional government successfully
organized a constitutional referendum on18 and 19 December 2005. The government
also held, for the first time in four decades, democratic elections for the presidency,
national assembly, and provincial legislatures in 2006. Moreover, the 2006 Congolese
Constitution has instituted, short of a federation, a highly decentralized unitary state.
The newly democratically elected President and the Prime Minister formally established
a government on 7 February 2007. A series of crises ensued, notably the humanitarian
disaster and the insecurity in Eastern Congo, though the new government is
painstakingly attempting to usher in an era of peace and development, driven by mining
activities.
3.1.2. Mining
Currently, mining production, including the artisanal mining of gold and diamond, has
just recently started to experience growth. However, notwithstanding its vast reserves of
copper and cobalt, the DRC still faces numerous formidable challenges in the mining
sector. The sector is characterized by:88 Vetust means of production; insufficient
financial, material and human resources; weak institutions for the administration of the
sector; decreasing export revenues because of poor capital inflows and investment
since the early 1990s; anarchic exploitation of mining sites; inadequate equipment; lack
of efficient control of exploitation methods; disrespect for the rules of the Mining Code
and the Mining Regulations; and the decline of the main mining state corporation,
Gécamines.
The ongoing restructuration and liberalization of the mining sector, initiated in 2004
countrywide under the 2002 Mining Code, have not yet realized their full potential. But
the mining sector stimulated an economic growth rate of 6.3 per cent as of December
2007 from 5.1 per cent in 2006. The surge of copper and other commodity prices, and
86
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the recent pledge of a five billion dollars loan by China for the development of mining
infrastructure in the DRC offer optimistic long-term prospects for the mining sector.89
3.2. The legal framework for the exploitation of mineral resources
The Constitution reaffirms the inalienable and imprescriptible right of the Congolese
peoples to organize freely and to develop their political, economic, social and cultural
life.90 The peoples, directly and through elected representatives, organized the mining
sector by enacting important laws, namely the Constitution, the Mining Code, and the
Mining Regulations. Together, these laws constitute the primary framework for the
exploitation of mineral resources in the DRC.
3.2.1. Mining in the Constitution
Article 9 vests in the state permanent sovereignty over its soil, sub-soil, waters, forests,
air space, rivers, lakes, territorial sea and continental shelf. This article necessarily
implies that the Congolese state exercises permanent sovereignty over its mineral
resources.91 Article 58 confers upon the peoples the right to enjoy their national wealth
and upon the state the corresponding duty to distribute it equitably as well as to
guarantee the right to development.92

3.2.2. Mining in the Mining Code
The most important piece of legislation on mining is undoubtedly the Mining Code.
President Joseph Kabila promulgated the Mining Code in 2002 and the Code, whose
drafting involved the World Bank,93 entered into force in 2003. The Code proclaims that
the principal role of the state is to ‘promote and regulate the development of the mining
89
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industry by the private sector’.94 The 2003 Mining Regulations complement the Code by
providing for the Code’s implementation.
The Code is a voluminous, comprehensive piece of legislation, with 344 articles and 17
titles, which in turn subdivide into several chapters and sections. The Code replaces an
archaic 1981 Ordonnance-Loi (order-law),95 thus modernizing legislation on mines.
Interpretation and application
Because the DRC is a former Belgian colony, the legal system of the DRC is primarily
based on Belgian law. So are the rules of statutory interpretation. When interpreting
legal texts like the Mining Code, lawyers, as a rule, assume that the legislator does not
make mistakes, that she is always rational and using the same coherent, univocal
language.96 In reality, this assumption is a fiction that sometimes seems necessary to
reduce the complexity of interpretation conundrums.97
Characteristically, therefore, lawyers will use the grammatical interpretation, the travaux
préparatoires (i.e. legislative materials), and the historical and teleological interpretation
of the Code.
As far as its scope of application goes, the new Code, unlike previous mining laws, does
not apply to hydrocarbons. It does also not cover preliminary geological work.98
Definitions
In enacting the Code, the Congolese parliament intended to create a ‘new attractive
legislation with objective, quick and transparent procedures for the granting of mining
and quarry titles, which organize tax, customs, and foreign exchange regimes for the
mines’.99 In so doing, the parliament was mindful of the fact that the two mining laws
94

C. MIN. art. 8. Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Mining art. 2(7)(providing
that one of the general principles of the Protocol is to encourage the private sector participation in the
exploitation of mineral resources). The DRC is a member of SADC.
95
Mining laws in Congo historically evolved as follows: Decree of December 16, 1910, as amended in
1919, (mining research and exploitation in the Katanga province); Decree of September 24, 1937 (on
mining research and exploitation in Congo, it replaced the 1910 Decree); Ordonnance-Loi no 67/231 of
May 3, 1967 (on mines and hydrocarbons, it replaced the 1937 Decree); Ordonnance-Loi no 81/013 of
April 2, 1981, (replaced the 1967 Ordonnance-Loi).
96
HUBERT BOCKEN & W ALTER DE BONDT, INTRODUCTION TO BELGIAN LAW 27 (Kluwer Law International
2001).
97
Id.
98
C. MIN. art. 2.
99
Exposé.

21

passed after Independence, especially their tax, customs, and foreign exchange
regimes, failed to attract foreign investment and had a negative impact on mining
production and public finances.100
Furthermore, in ascertaining the purpose of the Code, the definition of basic terms is
instrumental. Article 1 of the Code defines several terms relating to, amongst others,
rights and titles, minerals, the trade of minerals, artisanal exploitation, and the
environment. The Code defines mineral resources, sets out the various legal
relationships, and identifies the relevant actors. Regarding mineral resources, the Code
defines ‘mine’ as any deposit or artificial deposit of mineral substances classified as
mines, which can be exploited by means of an open cast or underground mining, and/or
any plant for the processing or transformation of the products of such exploitation
located within the perimeter of the mine.101 ‘Ore’ means any rock containing one or
more minerals made up of one or more chemical elements forming a naturally-occurring
substance, simple or complex, inorganic or organic, generally in a solid state, and in a
few exceptional cases, in a liquid or gaseous state.102 ‘Quarry’ means any deposit of
mineral substances classified as quarries suitable for open cast mining and/or any plant
for the processing of products relating to such exploitation.103
Mining rights are the cornerstone of the Mining Code. ‘Rights’ means any right to carry
out exploration and/or exploitation of mineral substances classified as mines.104
‘Perimeter’ means an area demarcated on surface and of indefinite depth relating to a
mining or quarry right.105
The Code also identifies the important actors in the mining sector. First, ‘purchasers’ are
individuals, employed by a trading house which purchases gold, diamonds or other
mineral substances extracted by artisanal mining methods, and who carry out their
activities in the office of an authorized trader.106 ‘Traders’ are Congolese nationals who
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purchase and sell mineral substances from artisanal exploitation107 while ‘authorized
traders’ are people authorized to purchase mineral substances extracted by artisanal
mining methods from traders or artisanal miners, for the purpose of reselling them
locally or exporting them.108 ‘Holders’ are people in whose name a mining or quarry right
is granted and a mining title or a quarry title is issued, and who carry out, directly or
through third parties, the operations authorized pursuant to his mining or quarry title.109
Substantive provisions:
(a) Mining titles
Article 3 of the Code retains the principle of state ownership of mineral resources.110 It
provides that all deposits of mineral substances are the exclusive and inalienable
property of the state. However, holders of mining rights own the products extracted and
processed for sale by virtue of their rights.111
The Code defines ‘mining titles’ as the official certificates issued by the Mining Registry
in accordance with the provisions of the Code, which evidence the existence of mining
rights.112 The Code divides mining titles into permits and authorizations, which in turn
sub-divides into five types of titles, namely exploration permits, exploitation permits,113
small

scale

exploitation

permits114

and,

quarry

exploration

and

exploitation

authorizations.
Unlike the former mining legal regime where exploitation permits and mining
concessions co-existed, the new Mining Code has eliminated mining concessions.
Concessions caused disequilibrium and discrimination in the Congolese mining
sector.115
107
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(b) Protection of the environment
The applicant for an exploitation title must provide: (1) an environmental impact study
(EIS) describing the foreseeable potential effects its operations may have on the
environment and the mitigating measures which will be taken;116 and (2) an
environmental management plan for the implementation and monitoring of the
measures provided in the EIS.117
As part of the process of the preparation of the EIS, the applicant must inform and
consult local populations.118 The objectives of the environmental management plan
include the safety of the site; reduction of nuisances of the operations on the
atmosphere and water, people and animals; and increasing the well-being of local
populations.119
The Mining Regulations set out the liability principle under the Code as follows:120
The permit holder is responsible for damage caused to the environment by its activities to the extent
that it has not complied with its approved environmental plan or has breached an environmental
obligation as set out in Title XVIII of the Mining Regulations.

(c) Financial regime
The Code ensures the stability of the financial regime.121 The financial regime of the
Code consists of three elements: (1) Tax and customs, (2) foreign exchange control,
and (3) securities.
Regarding taxes and customs, the Code provides for a single, exclusive and exhaustive
tax and customs regime, applicable to all titles and holders, excluding holders of quarry
exploration and exploitation rights.122 Even though it recognizes that taxation is a
determining factor in decisions to invest capital in a country,123 the Code expressly
states that the principles of such a regime are the maximization of state revenues and
116
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the rule of non-exoneration.124 The Code provides for a single reduced import tax (2 per
cent before the commercial operation date, 5 per cent after and 3 per cent for oil and
other consumables).125 There are three main taxes applicable to mining projects, to wit
mining royalties (redevance minière),126 10 per cent withholding tax (contribution
mobilière) on the mining company’s earnings,127 and 30 per cent tax on profits.128
The Code provisions on foreign exchange control allow permit holders to freely convert
their financial assets and to freely market their products abroad.129 A permit holder has
the right to retain 60 per cent of the sale proceeds outside the DRC (‘main account’)
with an international foreign bank having a correspondent bank in the DRC.130 In
addition, the holder may hold more than one account in foreign currencies at foreign
banks to manage debts and comply with other provisions (‘debt management
accounts’), with funds from the main account.131 Holders must also repatriate 40 per
cent of the sale proceeds on its national main account.132
Finally, with respect to securities, the Code creates two types of securities: Pledges of
marketable mining products133 and mortgages on both immovables and exploitation
titles.134 Upon request by the mortgagee or the holder, the Minister of Mines must
approve the mortgage in advance.135 In the event of default by the permit holder or
mortgagor, the Code provides for substitution by the mortgagee himself or a third
party.136
Application procedure
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Natural and juristic persons are eligible for mining titles. Foreign persons or entities
must elect domicile with an agreed ‘mining agent’ and act through his intermediary in
order to be eligible for mining titles.137 Foreign companies or persons are only eligible
for mineral or prospecting rights, whereas Congolese natural or juristic persons are
eligible for exploitation mining and quarry rights.138
With a view to providing transparency, objectivity, effectiveness and speed,139 the Code
sets up a three-step uniform application procedure for all mining titles. The first step is a
review by the Mining Registry (instruction cadastrale);140 the second step is a technical
review by the Mining Authority (instruction technique);141 and the third step is an
environmental review by the department in charge of the protection of the mining
environment (instruction environmentale).142
The application procedure may last for up to nine months in the absence of any judicial
dispute,143 although the Ministry of Mines may deliver a preliminary and conditional
exploitation permit if the first and second reviews are satisfactory.144
Applicants can refer disputes to the national administrative courts or judiciary courts.145
Moreover, upon issuing a mining title, the applicant may agree that disputes in relation
to such a title will be settled by arbitration by the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID), provided that the applicant is a national of another
contracting state according to the terms of article 25 of the ICSID Convention.146
Institutions
The Code has conferred important powers on four institutions: The President, the
Minister of Mines, decentralized authorities, and the Mining Register (Cadastre Minier).
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First, in terms of the Mining Code, the President may classify, declassify or re-classify
minerals as mines, quarries or reserved substances.147
Second, the Minister of Mines has a discretionary power to grant and cancel mining
titles,148 but the admissibility requirements for the application provided for in the Code
circumscribe the Minister’s discretion.149 The Minister may also approve the creation of
mortgages150, set up restricted access areas151 and reserve deposits to be submitted for
tender.152
Third, the Code empowers provincial and local authorities to grant such mining
authorizations as are not covered by the discretionary power of the Minister of Mines.153
Finally, like the department in charge of the protection of the mining environment,154 the
Mining Register is a body with legal status and financially autonomous, created by the
Code, although it falls under the control of the Ministry of Mines.155 The Mining Register
is responsible for the application procedures and the registration of mining rights and
assets.156 This ‘one-stop system’ or single window center should be a great
improvement for foreign and local investors157 because it streamlines the screening and
approval procedures by the Register.158
Infractions and penalties
The Code imposes different fines and imprisonment on persons who engage in illegal
activities, who commit offences, and who contravene the decisions of state authorities.
The Code penalizes a number of activities related to mineral substances, including
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illegal exploration and exploitation;159 theft or possession of stolen minerals;160
diversion;161 illegal purchase and sale;162 illegal keeping;163 and illegal transportation.164
The Code also penalizes the commission of certain offences, including fraud;165
infringements of health and safety regulations;166 corruption of civil servants;167 and
destruction, degradation and damage.168 Lastly, the Code penalizes several acts
against the ‘Mines Authority’, which refers to all the public administration entities in
charge of mines and quarries.169 These acts include offences or violence against agents
of the Mines Authority;170 hindering the activity of the Mines Authority;171 contravening
the decrees of the Minister of Mines and the decisions of the provincial governor.172
The above survey of the Mining Code shows that the Code does not explicitly link
mining and human rights. Notwithstanding the absence of explicit provisions connecting
mining and human rights, there are provisions in the Code that clearly benefit both
investors and the peoples. The Code, as it stands, is actually impressive, if judged by
the benefits it bestows on investors and the local peoples.173 The main reasons why
these benefits do not in practice trickle down to the peoples are corruption, lack of
institutional capacity and the selective and inconsistent implementation of the Code.
The next section describes practices by state and non-state actors in the mining sector
that violate the human rights of the Congolese peoples.
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3.3. Mining in the DRC: The differing patterns of exploitation
North and South Kivu, on the one hand, and Katanga, on the other, provide two differing
patterns of mineral exploitation. In North and South Kivu, the government and armed
militias compete for the control of mineral resources, thereby exacerbating insecurity in
the region. In the Katanga province, only the Congolese state controls the exploitation
of mineral resources. These different exploitation patterns imply that the peoples can
only control mineral resources, in the case of the two Kivus, if the state provides
security and, in the case of Katanga,174 if the state also reduces corruption and ensures
compliance with the Mining Code in both the informal and formal sector.175
3.3.1. Mining in the Kivus
North Kivu is located in the North East of the DRC and shares a border with Rwanda.
Since 1996, the DRC has lost the monopoly of force in North and South Kivu. Military
force and state authority are usurped by and dispersed among a maze of armed groups,
including the FDLR.176 Furthermore, the location of the Kivus in the Great Lakes region
has turned them into a crossroad for the ethnic conflicts, insurrections and movement of
refugees and armed groups from Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda. DRC’s mineral wealth
and its weak border controls have allowed many of these armed groups to become selffinancing and thus self-sustaining.177 During the 1998-2003 war, numerous rebel groups
in Eastern DRC funded their activities through the exploitation of minerals, such as
diamonds, coltan and cassiterite (tin ore).178 The massive increase in demand for tin
fuelled the illegal exploitation of tin, the plundering of natural resources in the DRC, and
the insecurity in the Kivus.
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In the Kivus, the state is incapable of fully controlling the exploitation of mineral
resources, which are also exploited illegally by armed groups operating in the region.
Nor is the state capable of ensuring the security of the local populations.179 On the
contrary, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), the
Congolese army, has been implicated, together with the other armed groups, in several
instances of looting, rape, killing, and in other atrocities.180
In spite of the reunification of the country and the holding of democratic presidential and
legislative elections, the pro-Rwandan insurgents led by dissident general Nkunda still
control large areas of North Kivu. Over the second half of 2007, fighting has broken out
around strategic mining towns, with the insurgents, the FARDC and other armed groups
vying for the control of these areas.
Unlike North Kivu, much of South Kivu is under the control of the state and the
FARDC.181 Yet the low and erratic pay the FARDC receives has prompted many
soldiers illegally mine or tax the miners to supplement their low income while the FDLR
is also controlling mines and mining revenues.182 Large quantities of minerals are
illegally exported, undeclared and untaxed, to such foreign countries as Rwanda,
Zambia, South Africa, China and other foreign countries, where they are processed with
little added value for the DRC.
Notwithstanding the ongoing government reform of the security sector, the FARDC is
still so under-resourced, disorganized, disunited and dysfunctional to quell the armed
groups operating in the Kivus. The challenges facing the FARDC are in large measure
the legacies of the civil wars and the 2003-2006 transition period.183
The government and the international community have sponsored a peace and security
conference that took place in January 2008 in Goma (North Kivu) to end the insecurity
in the Kivus,184 which has already caused the displacement of 400,000 people.185
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3.3.2. Mining in Katanga
The Katanga province, located in the South East of the DRC, is one of the world’s
richest copper and cobalt producing areas. Unlike the Kivus, the mining industry in
Katanga has a formal and an informal sector.186 In the formal sector, foreign or
multinational companies engage in large-scale, industrial mining activities, using
modern methods of mineral exploitation. In the informal sector, self-employed artisanal
miners dig for minerals independently, although the provincial government is
increasingly enforcing mining regulations.
The main reasons why the peoples do not control mineral resources in the DRC are
corruption and the inconsistent application of the Mining Code. Corruption and the
state’s failure to comply scrupulously with the Mining Code, especially in the informal
sector, have prevented the Congolese peoples from controlling mineral resources.
Effectively, the mining sector in Katanga is characterized by a system of widespread
and institutionalized corruption at all levels. Government officials, including high level
political actors, are involved in the negotiation of mining contracts, in siphoning off the
profits from the mineral exploitation in Katanga, and in collusions with trading
companies in circumventing control procedures and the payment of taxes.187 The
exploitation of mineral resources has enriched a small powerful elite, made up of
politicians and businessmen, leaving the vast majority of people in abject poverty.188
In the formal sector, the state entered into large mining contracts under the transitional
government since 2004.189 Many people in Katanga have complained about the
imbalanced nature of these contracts, which ensure disproportionately huge profits for
foreign or multinational companies and a negligible amount for the state mining
company Gécamines.190 These complaints have been reinforced by the lack of
transparency surrounding these contracts and the absence of public debate and
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consultation.191 After an extensive review of these contracts, the Congolese government
announced in March 2008 that it is to cancel many and to renegotiate others.192
The other major reason why the peoples do not control mineral resources is the fact that
the state does not consistently apply the Mining Code. More recently, however, the
newly elected Katanga governor Moise Katumbi Chapwe has been making notable and
significant efforts to regulate both the formal and informal sector by applying the
provisions of the Code.193 These efforts generated increased fiscal revenues, a form of
material benefit in terms of our definition of control.
As we have just said, the state does not fully implement several provisions of the Mining
Code. The export of minerals is one example in point. A significant proportion of the
copper and cobalt is mined informally, though the provincial government has reduced
the illegal export of minerals. But a year ago, experts believed that 90 per cent of mining
exports were illegal.194 Another example of the state’s poor compliance with the Code is
in the area of mineral value-addition. Many minerals exploited artisanally are exported
raw, which means that, even when these exports are declared, the DRC is still losing
out on the higher prices it could fetch had it processed the minerals before exporting
them.195 A third example of the defective application of the Mining Code is the state’s
failure to regulate the informal or artisanal mining sector. For instance, the state has
failed to protect artisanal miners from being extorted and exploited by trading
companies and government officials from the Ministry of Mines, the police, customs,
intelligence services, and local government offices, and even by the association
claiming to represent the rights of artisanal miners (‘Exploitants Miniers Artisanaux du
Katanga’ (EMAK)).196 Moreover, the state has failed to provide safe working conditions
for artisanal miners, who work in appalling conditions, without protective clothing,
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equipment or training, and die every year in preventable accidents, usually when they
are imprisoned by collapsing mineshafts.197
In conclusion, the probative value of this description of the exploitation of mineral
resources in the DRC is to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the state has
violated the rights of the peoples to control mineral resources. With the state failing to
provide security, reduce corruption, regulate the mining sector, and comply with the
provisions of its Mining Code, the peoples in Katanga and the Kivus, as in the rest of the
DRC, are dirt-poor and do not control mineral resources.
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4. THE LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR A PEOPLE-BASED CONTROL OF MINERAL
RESOURCES
We have seen that there is generally a relationship between mineral resources and
human rights and have just shown that, in the particular case of the DRC, this
relationship has led to human insecurity and instability. The crucial question of this
paper is how the law can justify the proposition that this relationship should facilitate
human development. Put another way, the central issue is: What are the legal grounds
for holding that peoples are entitled to control mineral resources in the DRC?
Our main submission is that the scholarship on the legal justifications for a peoplebased control of mineral resources does not fully articulate the right to control mineral
resources (RCMR). We develop this submission in three major stages: First, we first
enumerate and discuss the relevant principles and rules of Congolese and international
law; second, we argue that the RCMR is a right independent from these principles and
rules; and, third, we outline the contents of the RCMR. Unlike the first and second
stage, the third stage is the object of the next chapter.
In order to avoid that confusion over the use of concepts clouds the principal argument
of the paper, some basic distinctions should be made before a full discussion of the
legal principles and rules justifying the argument.
4.1. Basic distinctions
4.1.1. Control versus ownership of mineral resources
The contents and implications of ownership and control are fundamentally different.
Ownership is defined as:198
The bundle of rights allowing one to use, manage, and enjoy property, including the right to
convey it to others. Ownership implies the right to possess a thing, regardless of any actual or
constructive control. Ownership rights are general, permanent, and heritable.
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Control is defined in a legal sense as ‘the power or authority to manage, direct or
oversee’.199 With the legal sense of control in mind, state control of mineral resources
would refer in practice to the oversight and management powers of the Congolese
executive over mineral resources.
However, readers of the present paper should therefore distinguish between the legal
meaning of control and the meaning of control in this paper. Control is in this paper
defined in terms of participation and benefit of mineral resources.200 Thus, controlling
mineral resources means that the state or the peoples participate in the exploitation of
mineral resources201 and benefit in material terms from such exploitation.
A major point of this paper is not only to postulate that control requires participation and
benefit but also to utilize the concept as a benchmark for the evaluation of the legal
arguments for the control of mineral resources. Here, the underlying assumption is that
if the factually descriptive definition of control is the purpose of the paper, then the legal
justifications for such control should be evaluated in light of the factually descriptive
definition.
International law is ambiguous as to whether natural resources are owned or controlled
by the peoples or the state.202 Although the two concepts are closely related, the
argument expounded in the paper is that, whereas the peoples own mineral resources,
the state is the expression of that ownership. We elaborate on this argument and its
implications below.
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4.1.2. State versus people
Frequently, political scientists and other commentators use ‘state’, ‘government’ and
‘people’ interchangeably on the assumption that in a democracy the state is identical to
the people, if only because the state acts on behalf of the people. However, the two
concepts are in fact as in law distinct. In fact, the state in the DRC often competes with
peoples for the control of mineral resources in a manner that strips the peoples of their
RCMR. Joe Oloka-Onyango explains this fact in a way that applies to a great extent to
the DRC: 203
[S]tates in modern times serve less to facilitate the dynamic of self-determination than they serve
to impede it. Their most important function is as a direct competitor with their own peoples for the
resources of the territories they govern. This has led states to invest and expand upon their
monopoly over the means of violence.

In addition, equating the state and the peoples is unwelcome because of the real
danger that the exploitation of mineral resources will only benefit elites while
accentuating socio-economic hardship and inequalities.204
Those are some of the reasons why the state cannot be equated to peoples.
In law, article 1 of the Montevideo Convention defines a state in international law as
possessing the following qualifications:205 (a) a permanent population, (b) a defined
territory, (c) a government, and (d) the capacity to enter into relations with other states.
The paper defines ‘peoples’, using the plural form, as referring to the diverse social
groups in the DRC.206 Therefore, even if ‘state’ includes ‘peoples’ insofar as it refers to
the ‘permanent population’ of a defined territory, the two concepts are different.
The existing body of scholarship on the RCMR shows that there are several grounds in
law, whether municipal, regional or international, for peoples to press for the control of
mineral resources. The actual ground or grounds which individuals may rely on in a

203

J. Oloka-Onyango, Heretical Reflections on the Right to Self-determination: Prospects and Problems
for a Democratic Global Future in the New Millennium, 15 AM. U. INT’L L REV. 151, 206 (1999) [hereinafter
Oloka-Onyango, Self-determination].
204
Emeka Duruigbo, supra note 26, at 44; Stephen P. Marks, Emerging Human Rights: A New
Generation for the 1980s?, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 435, 447 (1981).
205
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.
206
See Chapter 1.

36

given case is a matter of strategic and tactical calculation rather than a mandatory
condition of Congolese or international law.
4.2. Justifications in municipal law
Under municipal law, justifications for the argument that peoples are entitled to control
mineral resources are found in the Constitution, the Mining Code and Mining
Regulations. There is at least one justification under each generation of human rights,
namely the principle of popular sovereignty (civil and political rights), socio-economic
rights and the right of people to enjoy their national wealth (peoples’ rights). However,
the pivotal justification is the right of peoples to enjoy their national wealth, from which
stem the obligation to redistribute natural wealth equitably and the obligation to
guarantee the right to development. We now discuss the right to enjoy national wealth
and the duty to redistribute that wealth equitably, but we discuss the right to
development in another section below under the heading ‘justifications in international
law’.

4.2.1. The peoples’ right to enjoy national wealth
Title II of the Congolese Constitution specifically provides for peoples’ rights (droits
collectifs).207 Title II includes article 58, which protects the right of peoples to enjoy their
national wealth, the paramount and most explicit justification for the peoples’ right to
control mineral resources. Article 58 of the Constitution stipulates that:
All Congolese have the right to enjoy their national wealth. The State has the duty to redistribute
equitably and to guarantee the right to development.

The right to enjoy national wealth is the municipal counterpart of the peoples’ right to
control mineral resources par excellence. It is also clear from the text of article 58 that
the right to enjoy national wealth imposes on the state two obligations, namely the duty
to redistribute equitably national wealth and the duty to guarantee the right to
207
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development. The downside of the right to enjoy national wealth, as formulated in the
Constitution, is that its skeletal form hardly says anything about its contents. We argue
below that the concept of ‘control’ should add flesh and substance to the right to enjoy
national wealth.
Some interpreters may contend that it does not necessarily follow from the structure of
the text of article 58 that the right to enjoy national wealth and the two obligations are
related, if only because the right and the two obligations appear in two different
sentences. However, the position of the right to enjoy national wealth at the beginning of
the article indicates its attribute as a ‘topic sentence’. The position of the right in the first
sentence of the article informs the interpreter that what immediately follows the first
sentence is but an elaboration of the first sentence. Furthermore, the concept of
‘enjoyment’ in the right is logically and semantically connected to and readily compatible
with the concepts of ‘equitable redistribution’ and ‘development’ in the two obligations.
The contextual interpretation of article 58 corroborates the affirmation that the right to
enjoy national wealth is related to the duty to redistribute wealth equitably and to
guarantee the right to development. For one thing, the sequencing of article 58 and its
neighboring articles discloses a logical progression. Article 56 prohibits conduct that
deprives peoples of the livelihood they derived from their own and from natural wealth;
article 57 penalizes such conduct; article 58 provides for the right to enjoy natural
wealth, and article 59 provides for the right to enjoy the common property of humankind.
This progression of articles demonstrates that within and across these articles the right
to enjoy national wealth is the unifying right and theme.
4.2.2. The duty of equitable redistribution
The duty of equitable redistribution amplifies the second element of control, which
requires that peoples benefit materially from mineral resources. Interestingly, the
inclusion of the state’s ‘duty to redistribute equitably’ national wealth inescapably leads
up to the implication that the Congolese Constitution creates a right of peoples to the
equitable redistribution of national wealth and, inferentially, mineral resources.
In French, ‘equitable’ means ‘consistent with equity’ and ‘equity’ means ‘the virtue of a
thing which or person who possesses a natural sense of justice, who respects the rights
38

of individuals, and who is impartial’.208

Read with the phrase ‘[a]ll Congolese’ in the

first sentence of article 58, the duty of the state to national wealth ‘equitably’ imposes on
the state a duty to redistribute mineral wealth equally and in a non-discriminatory
manner. Thus, the duty of equitable redistribution insinuates that distributive inequalities
may account for the fact that Congolese peoples do not benefit from the exploitation of
mineral resources.
The Mining Code appears to make an attempt to redistribute mining revenues equitably
through its distribution formula of mining royalties. The public treasury, which receives
all mining royalties, must allocate 60 per cent of the royalties to the central government,
25 per cent to the provincial government where the project is located, and 15 per cent to
the local government where the mineral exploitation activities take place.209 The
principle of non-exoneration, which precludes the state from granting tax exonerations,
consolidates the distribution formula of mining royalties.210 It also goes without saying
that an efficient redistribution is impossible without maximizing revenues.

4.2.3. Popular sovereignty
The legal principle
One justification for the control of mineral resources by the peoples is the principle of
popular sovereignty.211 Since the exposition of this principle by the French Renaissance
philosopher Jean Bodin, popular sovereignty has been of incredible importance. It is in
fact the foundational myth of the modern state.
Article 5 of the Congolese Constitution enshrines the principle of popular sovereignty:
National sovereignty belongs to the people. All [state] power derives from the people who
exercise it directly by way of referendum or elections and indirectly through representatives.

208

LE PETIT LAROUSSE ILLUSTRÉ 426 (2006).
C. MIN. art. 242.
210
Exposé.
211
SCOTT VEITCH ET AL., JURISPRUDENCE: THEMES AND CONCEPTS 10ff (Routledge-Cavendish
2007)(demonstrating that sovereignty there are other points of attribution of sovereignty apart from the
people).
209

39

The principle popular sovereignty says that there is one entity that can make and
unmake laws. That entity is the fiction of the ‘people’,212 which ultimately exercises state
authority through the democratic institutions of the state and freely chosen
representatives.213 After all, it is ‘[w]e, the Congolese people, united by destiny and
history around the noble ideals of liberty, fraternity, solidarity, justice, peace, and
labor,…[who] solemnly declare that we adopt the present Constitution.’214
By laying down that ‘[a]ll power derives from the people’, the second sentence of article
5 implies that the power of the state to oversee, manage and regulate the mining sector
ultimately derives from the Congolese peoples. Moreover, there is nothing in the text of
article 5 that indicates that the peoples are confined to referenda or elections to
exercise that power, nor does it state that peoples can only be represented by state
officials.215
Despite the practical and legal constraints of the principle of popular sovereignty, the
basic idea is that political systems should be justified and justifiable by some form of
popular consent. This is done in practice by the organization of periodic and regular
elections.
Though the Mining Code and the Mining Regulations may be seen as a manifestation
and a product of popular sovereignty, neither the Code nor the Regulations expressly
provide for it.
Evaluation of the legal principle
The principle of popular sovereignty is pivotal for the concept of control because one of
the two elements of our definition of control is participation.216 The fact that control
requires participation means that control is essentially a claim for a certain form of
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democracy. Effectively, one important principle or pillar of the concept of democracy is
popular sovereignty. In that sense, the principle of popular sovereignty increases the
odds of a people-based control of mineral resources.
Whereas the principle of popular sovereignty is provided for in the Congolese
Constitution,217 in practice the principle is not a very workable idea. First, the sheer
multiplicity, diversity, fluidity of identity and the increasing fragmentation in the
Congolese society dilute the fiction of ‘people’ imbedded in the principle of popular
sovereignty.218 Effectively, social fragmentation means that more often than not certain
social groups exercise state power and control mineral resources at the exclusion or
expense of other groups. Second, popular sovereignty is not workable because of what
the German sociologist Robert Michels referred to as the ‘iron law of oligarchy’.219 That
rule says that, no matter the political structures of state or government, a minority, of
whatever description, will always take decisions on behalf of the majority. In addition,
popular sovereignty assumes that the representatives elected by the peoples act in the
latter’s interest, which is entirely false in view of DRC’s post-independence history.
Finally, the idea of popular sovereignty does not guarantee that a democratically elected
government will ensure that peoples benefit from the exploitation of mineral resources.
The government can be properly authorized by free and fair elections and yet fail to
respond to the socio-economic demands of its citizenry.
On balance, however, the greatest substantive force of the principle of popular
sovereignty is that it is the ultimate justification for a people-based control of mineral
resources. The challenge is to create the conditions conducive to the realization of the
principle.

4.2.4. Democratic rights
Constitutional provisions
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A number of democratic rights can strengthen the claim for greater popular control of
mineral resources. These rights include the right to equality,220 non-discrimination,221
the right to participate in government through elections,222 freedom of conscience,223
freedom of expression,224 freedom of and access to information,225 freedom of
assembly,226 the right to demonstrate,227 the right to petition,228 freedom of
movement,229 and the right to receive information to guarantee transparent and
accountable resource exploitation.230
Evaluation of democratic rights
The greatest advantage of democratic rights is to remind that the realization of these
rights is a safest way to achieving the control of mineral resources. Democratic rights,
by ensuring rights of participation in a non-discriminatory manner, meet the first element
of our definition of control.231 The other advantage of democratic rights is that it affords
a platform for the audit of government practices in the mining sector by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs). NGOs and
CSOs are key stakeholders in creating the rights-protective settings conducive to the
control of mineral resources by the people.232
Still, the mere realization of democratic rights does not guarantee that the peoples will
benefit from the exploitation of mineral resources, which is the second element of our
definition of control. Policy makers will have also to address and resolve issues of good
governance, administrative efficiency and institutional capacity.
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4.2.5. Socio-economic rights
The law on socio-economic rights
Peoples can use socio-economic rights to urge the Congolese government to take
reasonable steps to give effect to the right of peoples to control mineral resources.233
Socio-economic rights are those entitlements that peoples possess and that they can
enforce against the government. Unlike civil and political rights, socio-economic rights
do not require the state to refrain from doing something but require the state to take
positive action. The necessity of realizing socio-economic rights for the popular control
of mineral resources resides in the pervasive socio-economic immiseration of the
majority of Congolese peoples.
In addition to the rights recognized in the CESCR,234 the Congolese Constitution
protects a stream of social, economic and cultural rights. The relevant socio-economic
rights include the right to invest;235 the right to work,236 to form a trade union237 and
other labor rights;238 and freedom of association.239
Material benefits and socio-economic rights
It bears cautioning that the concept of ‘benefit’ encapsulates more than socio-economic
rights. This is because mining can benefit the Congolese peoples materially in a variety
of ways. Most linkages work directly by generating income and creating opportunities for
growth for lateral and downstream businesses.240 There are also indirect linkages
through

investments.241

Investments

enable

better

social

services,

catalyze
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improvements in physical infrastructure, and provide transfer of patented technologies,
access to expertise, scarce managerial skills, and overseas market networks.242
Evaluation of the socio-economic rights
The claim that peoples are entitled to control mineral resources is another way of saying
that the state must enforce socio-economic rights. The advantage of socio-economic
rights as a justification for pursuing claims for the control of mineral resources is that
they provide a yardstick for determining some of the material benefits required by the
concept of control. In other words, peoples will control mineral resources if, in addition
to allowing people to participate in decision-making, the state provides education,
creates employment, attracts investment, protects labor rights, and so forth. Another
advantage is that, with reference to the implementation of rights, the text of the
Constitution, unlike that of the CESCR, is silent on both civil and political rights and
socio-economic rights. The constitutional text does not stipulate whether the
implementation of socio-economic rights is progressive and subject to the available
resources. Like it was argued with regard to the African Charter, from which incidentally
the Congolese Constitution draws inspiration, this omission has positive implications. It
may imply first that socio-economic rights are justiciable and second that the
implementation of socio-economic rights is immediate and absolute, which in turn is a
reflection of the indivisibility of all human rights.243
However, the socio-economic rights embodied in the Congolese Constitution do not
directly and expressly provide for any right for the peoples to control mineral resources.
In fact, socio-economic rights are vague and uncertain as to their contents. But there is
no doubt that the effective enforcement and implementation of socio-economic rights,
whatever their contents, will result in the control of mineral resources by the peoples.
The Congolese Constitution contains other provisions linking mineral resources and
human rights, but they are not relevant for our present purposes. Nevertheless, it
242
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deserves mentioning that the legal justifications for the argument that the peoples have
the RCMR are not absolute. The Constitution limits rights by subjecting them to a
regime of legal duties which, one African scholar controversially stated, may temper the
individualism of human rights norms with the individual’s obligations to the society.244
The Constitution subjects the peoples’ RCMR to, amongst others, the duty to respect
national laws,245 to prevent any attempt to upset the constitutional order,246 to fulfill its
obligations vis-à-vis the state,247 and to protect public property and the public interest.248
4.2.6. Relevant provisions of the Mining Code
The Mining Code is no human rights instrument and it thus comes as no surprise that it
does not explicitly provide for the right to control mineral resources. Nonetheless, by
virtue of the provisions of article 215 of the Constitution, interpreters of the Code are by
necessary implication obliged to read international human rights norms into the Code.
To recall, article 215 is the incorporation clause in that it declares that international law
is superior to the laws of the DRC.
Unlike the other principles and rules presented in this chapter, the provisions of the
Code do not directly empower peoples to claim the RCMR, but they are nonetheless
justificatory with regard to the RCMR. In addition, the Code’s provisions confer specific
benefits as opposed to the general right to control mineral resources. First, foreign and
Congolese investors stand to benefit from the Code because the Code defines the role
of the state as a regulator while leaving the task of developing the mining industry to
private investors.249 Articles 34 (right to private property) and 35 (right to private
initiative for both local peoples and foreign nationals) reinforce the role of private
investors in the development of the private sector. By the same token, the Code offers a
244
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package of investment guarantees, ranging from protection against unlawful
expropriation,250 to compensation (indemnité équitable),251 to stabilization clauses,252 to
dispute settlement forums.253 The Code also protects the rights of peoples during the
mining titles application process by allowing recourse to wide range of dispute
settlement forums, from national administrative courts to the ICSID.254
Second, the Code protects the rights of Congolese peoples by excluding foreign
nationals from the definition of ‘traders’.255 In addition, whereas foreign and local
investors own the products extracted or processed,256 one can arguably claim that the
stipulation that the state owns all mineral deposits is aimed at protecting the rights of
Congolese peoples.257
Fourth, the requirement that applicants for an exploitation title provide an environmental
impact study and manage plan as well as the requirement to inform and consult local
peoples clearly protect and benefit the peoples. Indeed, the objectives of environmental
management plan include increasing the well-being of local populations.258 Further, the
liability of the persons responsible for environmental damage obviously protects the
peoples.259
Sixth, to the extent that the Code’s tax, foreign exchange control and securities regime
has the practical effect of attracting investment in the mining sector, the Code
indubitably benefits the peoples. This is all the more so because the development of a
mining sector is capital-intensive. Either multinational companies or states are able to
exploit mineral resources in a manner and at a scale that can benefit the whole
economy because mining necessitates very extensive knowledge, skills, and
technology.260 In the absence of sizeable capital inflows, it is hard to imagine how the

250

C. MIN. art. 275.
Id.
252
C. MIN. art. 276.
253
C. MIN. art. 312-320. The Code allows for the referral of disputes to administrative courts (arts. 313314), ordinary or judicial courts (arts. 315-316) and to arbitration (arts. 317-320).
254
C. MIN. arts. 312 and 319.
255
C. MIN. art. 1 (33).
256
C. MIN. art. 3.
257
Id.
258
Mining Regulations art. 452.
259
Mining Regulations art. 405.
260
See Ian Gary, supra note 26, at 41.
251

46

state can develop its mining industry and how the mining industry in turn can
significantly benefit the peoples and the economy as a whole.
Eighth, the Constitution and the Code circumscribe the power of the Minister of Mines to
grant and cancel mining titles. The Constitution confers upon provincial governments
concurrent jurisdiction with respect to land and mining rights261 and exclusive jurisdiction
with respect to provincial mining programs.262 The Code specifies that provincial
governments may grant mining authorizations subject to the conditions set out in the
Code.263
Finally, certain infractions penalized in the Code – like the theft, the illegal purchase and
sale of minerals and the corruption of civil servants – indirectly benefit the peoples.
However, the Constitution criminalizes the violation of the peoples’ right to enjoy their
wealth.264 This criminalization provides direct protection to the right of Congolese
peoples to control mineral resources.
Evaluation of the Mining Code
The downside of the Mining Code is that it is not a human rights instrument. It does not
provide rights to individuals to charge the state to realize human rights. One of the
functions of the Mining Code is to solve disputes between investors and the state.
Another problem with the Mining Code is that it approaches dispute resolution from a
judicial perspective. In that sense, the Mining Code is limited in that it is unable to solve
issues on mining that for some or other reason cannot reach the courts or be resolved
by them only. The judicial approach is limited in that it is only reactively – as opposed to
proactively – that courts mediate disputes between human rights and investment
issues.265 Hence the adoption in this paper of advocacy and litigation as concurrent
strategies for the vindication of the right to control mineral resources.
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4.3. Justifications in regional and international law
The legal relevance of regional and international law for the RCMR is the fact that
regional and international law, by virtue of article 215 of the Congolese Constitution,
supersedes municipal law, which includes the Mining Code.266 In two cases, Eliwo and
Massaba, military courts applied international law despite the existence of relevant
provisions in national legislation. In the Eliwo case, which involved war crimes and
crimes against humanity, the military court of Mbandaka directly applied the provisions
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).267 Subsequently, in the
Massaba case, which also involved war crimes, the military court of Ituri, citing the Eliwo
case with approval, directly applied the provisions of the Rome Statute.268 In both
cases, the court relied on article 215 of the Constitution and preferred the provisions of
the Rome Statute over the provisions of municipal law, which they considered vague
and not clearly defined.
If the justifications for the RCMR in municipal law sufficed, they would have been
preferable to those in regional and international law. In fact, if they were effective, there
would not have been any need to search regional and international legal regimes for
ways and means to strengthen the enforcement of the RCMR. Sadly, the DRC has
weak enforcement mechanisms.
There is a great measure of agreement on the nature of the DRC as a weak state. The
DRC has been variously described as a weak state,269 a vampire state,270 and a
collapsed or failed state.271 Moreover, in the DRC, as in most African countries, the
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judiciary suffers from institutional insufficiencies relating to legitimacy and accessibility,
resource constraints, and enforcement mechanisms.272 The astonishingly immense size
of the DRC compounds the weakness of the state to implement its own policies and
laws.
In such circumstances, the strategic utility of international law, and international human
rights in particular, is to enhance the enforcement by the state of the RCMR. A study
conducted in 20 different states around the world by Heyns and Viljoen revealed that
international law has a tremendous influence on the understanding of human rights and
their limits at the domestic level.273 Another benefit of international human rights law in
the DRC is the real potential of human rights for multiplying the opportunities for
peoples to claim the right to control mineral resources. The nature of the Congolese
state necessitates the multiplication of advocacy opportunities. Because peoples cannot
fully trust the enforcement mechanisms of the state, they must be able to advocate the
control of mineral resources in several forums and under several normative systems,
whether national, regional or international. Hence the importance of the regional and
international law justifications for the control of mineral resources.
The most important international law justifications for the control of mineral resources
are the principle of economic self-determination, sovereignty over natural resources and
the right to development. The list of legal justifications is not exhaustive, though it
represents the major possible arguments for the RCMR. Moreover, it is imperative to
see these justifications as being mutually reinforcing and constitutive rather than
mutually exclusive.274 Whereas all the legal justifications or arguments are instrumental
for our purposes, the tactical and comparative advantage of each justification or
argument will depend on the circumstances. In the course of advocacy and litigation,
activists and lawyers will have to interpret the legal instruments which encapsulate
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these principles in good faith, according to their ordinary meaning and in light of their
purpose and goals.275
4.3.1. Economic self-determination
The principle
Under international law, peoples can claim control of mineral resources by virtue of the
right to economic self-determination or a people’s capacity to dispose freely of natural
wealth and resources.
A few key legal instruments enshrine the principle of economic self-determination.276 Of
these instruments, the CCPR and the ESCR are the most authoritative. Article 1(2) of
both CCPR and ESCR stipulates that:
All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without
prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation, based upon the
principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own
means of subsistence.

Articles 20 and 21 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights reinforces
article 1(2) of the two UN covenants. Article 20(1) of the African Charter provides that:
All peoples shall have...the unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination. They shall
determine their political status and shall pursue their economic and social development according
to the policy they have freely chosen.

In addition thereto, article 21 of the African Charter lays down that:
(1) All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right shall be exercised
in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people be deprived of it.
(2) In case of spoliation the dispossessed people shall have the right to the lawful recovery of its
property as well as to an adequate compensation.
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(3) The free disposal of wealth and natural resources shall be exercised without prejudice to the
obligation of promoting international economic cooperation based on mutual respect, equitable
exchange and the principles of international law.

Alice Farmer’s modern rendition of the principle identifies the following distinctive
provisions:277 (1) All peoples must be able to freely dispose of their mineral resources
(free disposition);278 (2) the peoples of a state have the right to participate in decisions
regarding the disposal of mineral resources;279 (3) mineral resources must be used in
the interest of peoples;280 (4) peoples must be able to use their mineral wealth in a
manner that benefits them;281 economic-self determination is a permanent right;282 (5)
economic self-determination is ‘unquestionable and inalienable’;283 (6) peoples are
beneficiaries and owners of mineral resources;284 (7) economic self-determination may
be integrated into advocacy strategies;285 (8) internal self-determination supports
economic self-determination;286 (9) economic self-determination may prevent external
self-determination or secession; (10) economic-self determination supports economic
liberalism and safeguards foreign investment.287
Evaluation of the principle
The economic self-determination, like political self-determination, more irrefutably
establishes that economic self-determination belongs to peoples. As Farmer notes, if
economic self-determination stems from the continuing right to internal selfdetermination, then the right to economic self-determination vest in peoples.288
It is surprising that, despite its critical attitude towards the state-centered application of
the self-determination principle, the principle of economic self-determination does not
articulate the rights and responsibilities of the private sector. The reason for this
277
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omission may lie in the fact much of international law is still state-centered.289 However,
one of the four obligations of states is to protect the right of peoples from infringement
by third parties and, consequently, the private actors.290 This obligation circumvents the
problem of the rights and responsibilities of the private sector.

4.3.2. Sovereignty over natural resources
The principle
The most relevant argument to claim greater control of mineral resources is the principle
of sovereignty over natural resources.291 Today, it is beyond question that sovereignty
over natural resources is a widely accepted and recognized principle of international
law.292 The most authoritative formulation of the principle of sovereignty over natural
resources is the Permanent Sovereignty Resolution of 1962, which proclaims that:293
The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and
resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of the well-being of
the people of the State concerned.

The purposes for formulating the principle of permanent sovereignty were originally to
secure the benefits arising from exploiting natural resources for peoples living under
colonial and to protect their newly independent states against violations of their
sovereignty by foreign states or corporations.294 However, the emerging consensus is
that states must manage their resources in the interests of economic development and
that of their population, and in an environmentally sustainable manner.295
It is clear that the Permanent Sovereignty Resolution assumed the right to permanent
sovereignty to belong to both peoples and state. In view thereof, the thrust of Duruigbo’s
argument is to posit persuasively that peoples are the owners of natural resources and
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then to conclude that permanent sovereignty, traditionally regarded as a state’s right, is
in reality a peoples’ right.
Schrijver showed that sovereignty over natural resources entails a number of
associated rights, all of which can found a claim by the peoples for the control of mineral
resources. These rights include the right to dispose freely of natural resources;296 the
right to explore and exploit natural resources freely; the right to use national resources
for national development;297 and the right to regulate foreign investment.298
Evaluation of the principle
Assuming that the right belongs to peoples, the sovereignty over natural resources is a
compelling and cogent argument for the RCMR. By awarding ownership of natural
resources to the peoples, it gives peoples the means to participate in the exploitation of
natural resources and increases the likelihood that peoples will benefit from it.
The Achilles’ heel of sovereignty over natural resources is that its application in the
DRC will raise a host of thorny interpretive issues because of potential conflicts between
municipal and international law in this area.299 Indeed, article 9 of the Congolese
Constitution

unambiguously

provides

that

the

state

‘exercises’

permanent

sovereignty.300 Thus, unless article 9 is so interpreted as to imply that the state
‘exercises’ permanent sovereignty ‘on behalf of peoples, who own natural resources’,
permanent sovereignty will be too contentious an issue to be practically effective.

4.3.3. The right to development
The law on the right to development
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The controversial right to development is another ground for a claim by the peoples for
the control of mineral resources.301 The pertinence of the right to development as a
legal justification for the RCMR also emanates from article 58 of the Congolese
Constitution, which integrates the right to development into the right to enjoy national
wealth. The right to development takes on several facets, the most comprehensive of
which is the right of peoples to choose their economic, social system freely and to
determine their own model of development.302 However, like Jack Donnelly cautioned,
the right to development does not imply the right to live in a developing country; it is only
a right to pursue development.303
In 1986, the UN General Assembly proclaimed the right to development in the
Declaration on the Right to Development.304 The 1993 Vienna Declaration described the
right to development as ‘a universal and inalienable right and an integral part of
fundamental human rights.’305 The mandate of the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights to establish ‘a new branch whose primary responsibilities would include the
promotion and protection of the right to development’306 strengthens the right to
development.
In essence, the Declaration focuses on the right of individuals to national development
policies that improve their well-being equitably and with their full participation. Thus, like
the right to economic self-determination, the right to development fulfils the process and
outcome requirements of the control of mineral resources.
Arjun Sengupta, the UN Independent Expert on the Right to Development appointed in
1998, elaborated on the content of the right to development by adding that:307
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-

The right to development is a right to a process through which all human rights
and fundamental freedoms are fully realized;

-

the process itself must reflect a human rights approach, demonstrating
transparency, participation, non-discrimination, and accountability; and

-

the right to development concept rejects the notion of trade-offs between one
right and another or between human rights and economic growth, requiring an
integrated approach to all human rights.

The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development addresses, through the principle
of sustainable development, the strain between the demand for development and the
protection of the environment. Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration states that
The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and
environmental needs of present and future generations.

Further, Principle 4 states that:
In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral
part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it.

Evaluation of the right to development
The right to development suffers from a variety of handicaps. The greatest handicap of
the right to development concerns its contents and its contours. The meaning of the
right to development has over the years been fluctuating and today the right to
development is a nebulous, amorphous and contested concept.308 Like US
representative Novak remarked in 1981, ‘[t]he concept of “development” is itself in need
of development.’309 To be sure, there is no internationally accepted definition of the right
to development. For instance, whilst the United States conceives of the right to
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development as a synthesis of human rights the UN Independent Expert conceives of it
as a vector of human rights. Marks describes the latter position as follows:310
The right to development is a composite right to a process of development; it is not just an
“umbrella” right, or the sum of a set of rights. The integrity of these rights implies that if any one of
them is violated, the whole composite right to development is also violated. The independent
expert describes this in terms of a “vector” of human rights composed of various elements that
represent the various economic, social and cultural rights as well as the civil and political rights.
The realization of the right to development requires an improvement of this vector, such that there
is improvement of some, or at least one, of those rights without violating any other.

The second handicap is the difficulty in identifying the beneficiaries and the dutyholders.311 Over and above these identification difficulties, there are issues relating to
the regulatory functions of the right to development. Although it is clear that the right to
development exists as a set of principles, it is yet still uncertain whether the right exists
as specific rules aimed at regulating state behavior.312
4.4. The right to control mineral resources (RCMR)
4.4.1. The thesis
The main argument of this paper is that the different treatises on the legal justifications
for a people-based control of mineral resources do not fully articulate the RCMR.
Although there exist several legal justifications for people-based mineral control, the
scholars who elaborated on these justifications all assumed that there can only be one
principal ground on which peoples could claim the control of mineral resources. This
chapter demonstrates that it is not so.
The argument is also that the treatises on the legal justifications for a people-based
mineral control do not articulate the RCMR in the context of three generically different
forms of law, namely municipal, regional and international law. Nor did the treatises
elaborate on the RCMR as it relates to first and second generations of human rights.

310

Arjun Sergunta, Fifth Report of the Independent Expert on the Right to Development, at 5 ¶ 6,
submitted in Accordance with Commission Resolution 2002/69, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2002/WG.18/6 (2002).
311
Isabella D. Bunn, supra note 28.
312
See e.g. Stephen Marks, Development, supra note 309, at 150.

56

The present paper explicitly accomplishes this relation by incorporating democratic
rights (participation) and socio-economic rights (benefit) in the concept of control.

4.4.2. The RCMR as an independent right
On closer scrutiny of the literature on legal justifications put forth for a people-based
mineral control, one realizes that such literature does not actually say that there is a
right to control mineral resources as a legal right. Rather, it says that certain legal
principles justify the control of mineral resources as a fact.313 Stated differently, the
literature fully articulates the justifications for the control of mineral resources and not
the RCMR.314 The difference is fundamental because it means that the literature denies
the existence of the RCMR as such or as a right independent of its justifications in
national, regional and international law. This difference is problematic because the
exploration of the legal justifications for a people-based mineral control elicits the
inescapable inference, drawn from the provisions of municipal and international law,
that peoples have the RCMR. The paper demonstrated, through its survey of the legal
justifications for a people-based mineral control, that any alternative interpretation will
contradict either Congolese or international law.
The RCMR can exist independently as a fundamental principle of municipal, regional
and international law. The RCMR can also be specific as the contents of the principle in
specific situations will vary according to the contexts and the specific legal provisions
relied on.

4.4.3. The nature of the right
Even though a detailed analysis of the RCMR is beyond the purview of this paper, a few
general comments can be made on the nature of the RCMR.
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The RCMR is a third-generation human right.315 It belongs to the peoples, albeit the first
and second generations of human rights that we have identified earlier also form the
contents of the RCMR. This attribute of the RCMR implies that the state has an
obligation to extend standing to appear in court to individuals bringing claims on behalf
of peoples. Incidentally, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has
already allowed a wide range of complainants to bring complaints before it.316
Following the decision in the SERAC case, the RCMR imposes four obligations on the
state, namely:317
1. To respect – the state shall refrain from inferring with the enjoyment of peoples’
RCMR318 by, for example, refraining from blocking the peoples from forming
associations and organizing politically in order to participate in decisions
concerning the exploitation of mineral resources;
2.

To protect – the state shall protect the peoples from infringements of their
RCMR319 by, for example, preventing investors from mining in a way that
adversely affects the RCMR;320

3. To promote – the state shall ensure that the peoples are able to exercise their
RCMR321 by, for example, raising awareness about the RCMR; and
4. To fulfill – the state shall put in motion its machinery for the actual realization of
the RCMR322 by, for example, building infrastructures or other sorts of resources
facilitating the enjoyment of the RCMR.
In interpreting the rights of indigenous peoples, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights in the Awas Tingni323 adopts a non-literal and anti-positivist construction of
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human rights that informs the interpretation of the RCMR. In that case, the Court held
that:324
The terms of an international human rights treaty have an autonomous meaning, for which reason
they cannot be made equivalent to the meaning given to them under domestic law. Furthermore
such human rights are live instruments whose interpretation must adapt to the evolution of the
times and, specifically, to current living conditions.

The Awas Tingni suggests that the interpretation of the RCMR, as provided for in such
human rights treaties as the CCPR and CESCR, should be different from the one
adopted in municipal law. However, in the case of the Congolese legal system, the
interpretation of human rights treaties in international law is, by virtue of the operation of
article 215 of the Constitution, legally binding on domestic courts.

4.4.4. Violations of the RCMR
A human rights approach legalizes and legitimizes the claims of the Congolese peoples
to control mineral resources. This is because human rights law creates rights of action
for peoples to enforce their rights. To enforce such rights, claimants must in the first
place establish that there has been a violation of the RCMR.
Logically, to make out a case of RCMR violation, proof that a certain conduct or
situation resulting in peoples not controlling mineral resources should suffice. This
consequentialist approach finds support in article 56 of the Congolese Constitution.
Article 56 lays down that any act or any other fact that has as a consequence the
deprivation of the livelihood of peoples or of their natural wealth in whole or in part, is an
offence punished by law.325
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Thus, the mere violation of the Mining Code provision on the distribution of mining
royalties, or any provision or legislation, does not automatically amount to the violation
of the RCMR.326 However, if parties can prove that, as a consequence of that provision
being violated, peoples could not participate in or benefit from the exploitation of mineral
resources, court and lawyers would find a violation of the RCMR.327
In the next chapter, we elaborate on the third phase of the main argument, namely the
implications of the argument that the peoples have a RCMR.
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5. CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF A PEOPLE-BASED CONTROL OF
MINERAL RESOURCES
Having identified the legal justifications for the proposition that the people are entitled to
control mineral resources in the DRC, the next question concerns the measures that the
government must take to realize such control. However, because the detailed analysis
of the policy implications of the RCMR can support an entire university course, this
section simply outlines the policy choices for the practical and effective materialization
of the RCMR. The finding made earlier in this paper – that most literature on the right of
peoples to control natural wealth and resources does not articulate the logical
implications of that right328 – requires that we address the policy implications of a
people-based control of mineral resources.
5.1. Legal implications
From our exploration of the legal justifications for the RCMR, a normative cluster of
principles and rules of law flow. Such a normative framework is highly desirable
because it is one of the ways in which law can assist the peoples in their quest for the
control of mineral resources.329 These principles and rules are:
(1)

National sovereignty belongs to the peoples;

(2)

National sovereignty refers to the power of peoples to legislate and regulate their
own affairs, including the mining sector;

(3)

Peoples are beneficiaries and owners of mineral resources;

(4)

Peoples must be able to freely dispose of their mineral resources;

(5)

Peoples have the right to participate in decisions regarding the disposal of
mineral resources;

(6)

Mineral resources must be used in the exclusive interest of peoples and
according to the policies they have freely chosen;
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(7)

Peoples exercise their sovereignty directly by way of referendum or elections and
indirectly through the democratic institutions of the state and freely chosen
representatives;

(8)

peoples must be able to control mineral wealth in a manner that improves their
material conditions of living;

(9)

The right to control mineral resources entails that peoples organize themselves
for and associate NGOs in the audit of government practices in the mining
sector;

(10) Peoples have the right to control mineral resources and the state has the
corresponding obligations to redistribute equitably and to guarantee the right to
development;
(11) Equitable redistribution of mineral wealth and the right to development in turn
impose on the state the obligation to reduce, with a view to eradicating,
corruption and to promote transparency;
(12) The state is obliged to build institutional capacity and to provide security and
favorable macro-economic and investment environments;
(13) The claim that peoples are entitled to control mineral resources is the first thread
of the argument that the state must ensure democratic rights, especially nondiscrimination and equality (participation element);
(14) The claim that peoples are entitled to control mineral resources is the second
thread of the argument that the state must enforce socio-economic rights,
including the right to invest and labor rights (benefit element);
(15) The right to control mineral resources buttresses economic liberalism and
safeguards foreign investment;
(16) Peoples may not be deprived of their right to control mineral resources or their
own means of subsistence;
(17) In case of spoliation the dispossessed peoples shall have the right to the lawful
recovery of their property as well as to an adequate compensation;
(18) Lawmakers should work out a coherent scheme for the liability of the state and
investors and for the determination of such liability in specified forums for dispute
resolution; and
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(19) The right to control mineral resources does not imply a trade-off between human
rights or between human rights and economic growth, requiring an integrated
approach to all human rights.

These are all the legal principles that must be read into the Mining Code, the Mining
Regulations and the Constitution, and integrated in all mining practices in the DRC. This
reading and integration of the principles derived from the RCMR will infuse human
concerns into mining legislation and practices.
5.2. Policy implications
The RCMR has also important repercussions on political, financial, mining and social
institutions in the DRC. The assumption is that efforts to empower the peoples to control
mineral resources in the DRC cannot succeed without simultaneously tackling the
institutional deficiencies of the DRC as a state: Lack of capacity and of political
participation, pathological corruption, infrastructural decay and inadequacy, and chronic
instability.

5.2.1. Institutional policies
(Re)conceptualization of state – The effective implementation of the RCMR calls for a
reconceptualization of the state. In the process, it is imperative to avoid Eurocentric
political models.330 Historically, the state in the DRC was created for the export of raw
materials and not for its own development. Pierre Englebrecht reminds that the
DRC,which was created as the institutional façade of a foreign enterprise of ivory and
rubber exploitation, reproduced as the instrument of a violent extractive colonization
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system.331 Coupled with decades of mismanagement and corruption, today the state
does not have strong institutions, nor does its infrastructure stretch far beyond the few
and small urban areas of the country, the third largest in Africa.
Role of the state – The Mining Code defines the role of the state in the mining sector as
that of a promoter and a regulator, leaving it to the private sector to drive development
in the sector.332 In other words, the Mining Code posits private sector development as
the driver for mining development and economic growth and denies the probability of a
developmental state. However, this definition of the role of the state is not without
dangers. Joe Oloka-Onyango urges confronting the negative impact privatisation and
globalization have had upon attempts by peoples to attain popular sovereignty.333
Oloka-Onyango’s argument could have been more convincing if he could establish that
the real issue was privatisation and not the twin evils of corruption and the failure to
redistribute mining revenues equitably.
Emeka Duruigbo relied on the holding of the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (Commission) in SERAC to advocate the definition of the role of the
state as a trustee.334 In that case, the Commission held that article 21 of the African
Charter (on the free disposal of peoples’ wealth and natural resources) imposed a duty
on the state.335 Duruigbo utilized that holding to conclude that governments, as trustees,
are in a fiduciary relationship with the citizens that they cannot abuse by, for instance,
diverting national wealth for their private use.336 Indeed, the RCMR implies a fiduciary
relationship with peoples, but the correlative concepts of ‘agent’ and ‘principal’ are
preferable to the concept of trust because it is unknown to most civil law jurisdictions,
including the DRC.337 Thus conceived, the state as an agent owes a duty of good faith
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to the peoples as principal in the exploitation of mineral resources and the destribution
of mining revenues.
Decentralization - The Constitution defines the role of the state in terms of
decentralization as well. The Constitution establishes a government and a legislature at
both national and provincial levels. Decentralization and the devolution of power in
general are vital to the popular participation in and benefit from the exploitation of
mineral resources. Decentralization reinforces the peoples’ right to self-determination
and efforts to combat institutionalized corruption. However, the constitutional fiscal
arrangements are a bone of contention between the central and provincial
governments. Although article 175 provides for the retention of 40% of national taxes by
provinces, the government has been adamant in its refusal to leave the 40% to the
provinces. Two senators have recently commenced legal action to challenge the
constitutionality of the 2008 budget because it did not provide for the retention of 40% of
national taxes by provinces.338 Muna Ndulo remarks that, for the generation of local
economic initiatives to be possible, the central government must refrain from keeping
the major sources of revenue to itself and leave minimal sources to local
governments.339
State ownership of mineral resources – One of the legal implications of the RCMR is
that peoples are the owners of mineral resources. This implication contradicts article 3
of the Mining Code, which provides that the state owns all deposits of mineral
substances. On the other hand, article 9 only provides that the state exercises
permanent sovereignty over resources. It is submitted that an interpretation of article 9
of the Mining Code that is in tune with the RCMR is to hold that peoples own mineral
resources but that the state exercises that right as an agent of the peoples. After
analysing the text and the spirit of article 9 of the Constiution, Garry Sakata concludes
338
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that article 9 means that the state remains the owner of mineral resources, but it is no
longer the exclusive owner.340
Security reform – Security is a precondition for the control of mineral resources by the
peoples, especially in the Kivus. Despite the presence of the world’s largest UN
peacekeeping force and the security reform the government has embarked upon, the
Kivus are still highly volatile and unstable provinces in the DRC. The realization of the
RCMR is inconceivable without restoring security in the Kivus and in the rest of the
country. Because of the regionalization of insecurity in the Great Lakes region, the DRC
must promote regional economic cooperation and good neighborliness. This is all the
more imperative for peace in the DRC as it is the only country in Africa surrounded by
eight neighbors. Consequently, peace and stability in the DRC and its mining sector
significantly depend on its regional diplomatic relations.
Good governance – The effective participation in and benefit from the exploitation of
mineral resources in the DRC requires good governance as an institutional policy. John
Hatchard and others define good governance as involving ‘more than putting
constitutional limits to the power of the government’ and as ‘the conscious management
of regime structures with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of the public realm’.341 In
the DRC context, good governance would therefore imply the conscious management
of the mining sector in a manner that optimizes participation of and material benefits for
the peoples, which also calls for greater transparency and accountability.
Corruption and transparency – It is beyond question that corruption has prevented
peoples from participating in and benefiting from the exploitation of mineral resources.
Speaking of oil, Ian Gary says that transparency allows peoples to track how much
money mineral resources generate and how the government spends these revenues.342
Corruption and the lack of transparency have led many an analyst to conclude that the
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real problem is not so much the contents of Congolese laws as the defective
implementation of these laws. While the reduction of corruption is a sine qua non
condition for the realization of the RCMR, it is incorrect to state that the sole problem is
corruption because there is certainly a need for policy and institutional reform in the
DRC.
Integration of national legislation and international law – the RCMR also requires the
incorporation of international norms into municipal law. In the case of the DRC, article
215 of the Constitution effects the integration of international law into Congolese law.
Interpretation – the RCMR is a mandate on DRC’s future Constitutional Court to
construe the provisions relating to the control of mineral resources as human rights
provisions. The RCMR is also a recognition that the ultimate source of human rights is
not the text of legal instruments that enshrine them but the fundamental values from
which they draw inspiration.343 These values include autonomy, human dignity, equality,
and justice.344
Negotiation of mining contracts – The RCMR implies that state officials must vigorously
and effectively negotiate and draft mining contracts so that peoples benefit from these
contracts. Unfortunately, in the past, the negotiation of mining contracts, especially
during the 1996-2003 civil wars, disregarded the interest and benefit of peoples. The
Lutundula parliamentary report on the validity of contracts signed during the civil wars
concluded that the transitional government mismanaged the mining sector345, and
poorly negotiated and drafted mining contracts. There exist different obstacles in the
way to effective contract-making in the natural resources sector. These obstacles
include corruption, differences in bargaining power, asymmetries of expertise, and
international pressure. The Congolese experience has shown that the strict application
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of the Mining Code may diminish the probability of pressure or corruption by providing in
great detail the fiscal regime of the mining industry. By specifically providing for tax, the
Code renders negotiations for tax exonerations illegal and thus decreases the risk of
pressure and corruption.346 Finally, the state must publish draft mining contracts so as
to enable peoples to monitor the negotiation of these contracts.

5.2.2. Mining policies
Large scale mining policies - Policymakers should generally, with regard to large-scale
mining, formulate policies aimed at:347 (1) avoiding the Dutch disease and its effects on
the economy; (2) improving governance of state-owned enterprises; (3) increasing
opportunities for the non-mining sectors of the economy; (4) changing the culture of
dependency, which consists in the government tending to leave service to delivery to
mining company, thus creating a vacuum during mine closure and post-closure periods;
(5) managing at an early stage mine closures; (6) preventing the threats to indigenous
people’s land ownership and use in absence of legal frameworks; (7) articulating the
roles to be played by key actors in the mining sectors, namely the multinational
enterprises, intergovernmental organizations, and voluntary enforcement mechanisms;
(8) and allowing local communities to access information and participate in key
decision-making processes.
Small scale mining policies – In addition to the policy choices above, policymakers
should generally, with regard to small-scale mining, formulate policies aimed at:348 (1)
increasing the poor’s opportunities for income generation and subsistence as they
compete with incoming small-scale miners; (2) providing health care and education
facilities for small-scale miners in the context of an unregulated environment; (3)
significantly decreasing, with the ultimate purpose of eliminating, child labor; (4)
decreasing the risks of losing property and income where mining rights are not
regulated or protected; (5) preventing the invasion of lands of indigenous or tribal
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people by miners; and (6) preventing risks of cultural conflicts between miners and local
or indigenous population.

5.2.3. Financial policies
(Re)distribution of mining revenues and social cohesion – Article 58 of the Constitution
indicates that the redistribution of the mining revenues is at the heart of the RCMR. In
the context of the DRC, that redistribution has to be equitable and transparent.
Transparency in turn demands an accountable government. The centrality of
redistribution lies in the fact that, without redistribution, social cohesion and national
reconciliation are pious wishes.
Tax,customs, foreign exchange regimes – The redistribution of mining revenues is
mainly achieved through the instrumentality of the Mining Code’s tax, customs and
foreign exchange regimes, including the provisions on non-exoneration and on the
convertibility of financial assets. That is all the more reason for the strict and consistent
application of the Mining Code.
Saving and volatility funds – For all its qualities, the Mining Code conspiciously fails to
provide for a saving fund nor a volatility fund. Saving funds, pursuant to the principle of
sustainable development, enable future generations to benefit from mineral resources.
Although the government can provide for such fund or account by means of tax law in a
separate piece of legislation, it would have been preferable to expressly provide for a
saving fund in the Mining Code to bind the state to the provision of such fund. Moreover,
given the inevitable fluctuations in the commodity market, it is similarly surprising that
the Mining Code failed to provide for a stability fund. This failure exposes the DRC and
increases its vulnerability to external shocks in the commodity market.
Maximization of state revenues – a corrollary of the obligation on the state obligation to
redistribute mining revenues equitably is the maximization of these revenues. It is self-
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evident that, absent such maximization, there will only be small revenues to redistribute
and, consequently, small benefits for the peoples.

5.2.4. Social policies
There are a few social policy choices that the DRC can adopt to realize the control of
mineral resources by the peoples. The most important of these choices is the realization
of socio-economic rights.
Socio-economic rights - Socio-economic rights can solve some of the formidable
developmental

challenges

faced

by

the

DRC.

Socio-economic

rights

have

developmental aspects beyond their merely survival aspects. The Constitution provides
for socio-economic rights that the government can use as development policy agenda.
The realization of socio-economic rights is, however, as daunting and unenviable as the
other developmental challenges of the DRC. The political, economic, social and
developmental challenges facing the new government are unenviable and daunting.
Although the DRC, which is endowed with vast mineral wealth, is implementing reforms
and economic stability is improving, the economy of the DRC is performing well below
its real potential.
Protection and regulation of artisanal miners – The protection and regulation of small
scale miners necessitate special consideration given the uniquely vulnerable of
Congolese artisanal miners, who are constantly susceptible of being exploited by key
actors in the mining sector. Furthermore, the state must ensuring the health and safety
of miners.
Linkages between RCMR and private investment – It bears insisting that the policy
makers cannot disentangle the realization of the RCMR and private investment. The
model of a developmental state has no reasonable chance of succeeding in the DRC.
This is why policy makers should promote and embrace private investment, mostly
foreign investment, to develop the mining industry. In the existing circumstances, the
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Congolese state does not have the capacity to absorb and directly integrate the
exploitation of mineral resources such that the bulk of the exploitation, especially the
processing of minerals, is done abroad. For this and other reason, the efficient
exploitation of minerals in the DRC is inconceivable without private investment.
Local participation and technology transfer – Local participation and technology transfer
are tested ways of enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the mining industry and
mineral exploitation.
This final chapter has outlined the principles and policy choices that can best leverage
DRC’s vast mineral wealth to bring about development for the peoples. Given the
exploratory nature of the research, the principles and policy choices enunciated and
outlined in this chapter are tentative and merely calculated to spark additional in-depth
debates and studies.
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